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Abstract: We address the question of typing noninterference (NI) in Milner’s Calculus of
Communicating Systems (CCS), in such a way that Milner’s translation of a standard parallel
imperative language into CCS preserves both an existing NI property and the associated
type system. Recently, Focardi, Rossi and Sabelfeld have shown that a variant of Milner’s
translation, restricted to the sequential fragment of the language, maps a time-sensitive
NI property to that of Persistent Bisimulation-based Non Deducibility on Compositions
(PBNDC) on CCS. However, since CCS was not equipped with a security type system, the
question of whether the translation preserves types could not be addressed. We extend
Focardi, Rossi and Sabelfeld’s result by showing that a slightly different variant of Milner’s
translation preserves a time-insensitive NI property on the full parallel language, by mapping
it again to PBNDC. As a by-product, we formalise a folklore result, namely that Milner’s
translation preserves a natural behavioural equivalence on programs. We present a type
system ensuring the PBNDC-property on CCS, inspired from type systems for the π-calculus.
Unfortunately, this type system as it stands is too restrictive to grant the expected type
preservation result. We sketch a solution to overcome this problem.
Key-words: Noninterference, type systems, parallel imperative languages, process calculi,
bisimulation.
Non-interfe´rence oriente´e-e´tats pour CCS
Re´sume´ : Nous nous inte´ressons a` la question du typage de la proprie´te´ de non-interfe´rence
(NI) dans le calcul CCS (Calculus of Communicating Systems) de Milner. Le but recherche´
est de prouver que la traduction de Milner d’un langage impe´ratif paralle`le vers CCS pre´serve
a` la fois une proprie´te´ de non-interfe´rence connue et l’un des syste`mes de types associe´s.
Re´cemment, Focardi, Rossi et Sabelfeld ont montre´ qu’une variante de la traduction de
Milner, restreinte au fragment se´quentiel du langage, pre´serve une proprie´te´ de NI sensible
au temps en lui faisant correspondre une proprie´te´ de se´curite´ existante pour CCS, appele´e
Non Deductibilite´ Persistante par Compositions base´e sur la Bisimulation (PBNDC). Tou-
tefois, CCS n’ayant pas e´te´ pre´alablement e´quipe´ d’un syste`me de types pour la se´curite´,
la question de la pre´servation des types par la traduction ne pouvait eˆtre pose´e. Nous
e´tendons le re´sultat de Focardi, Rossi et Sabelfeld en montrant qu’une nouvelle variante de
la traduction de Milner pre´serve une proprie´te´ de NI insensible au temps sur l’ensemble du
langage, en l’envoyant e´galement sur la proprie´te´ de PBNDC. Au passage, nous formalisons
un re´sultat appartenant au folklore, notamment que la traduction de Milner pre´serve une
e´quivalence comportementale sur les programmes. Nous pre´sentons un syste`me de types
pour CCS garantissant la proprie´te´ de PBNDC. Ce syste`me est inspire´ de syste`mes de types
pre´ce´demment propose´s pour le π-calcul. Malheureusement, notre syste`me de types s’ave`re
trop restrictif pour refle´ter l’un des syste`mes de types existants pour le langage impe´ratif.
Nous esquissons une solution a` ce proble`me.
Mots-cle´s : Non-interfe´rence, syste`mes de types, langages impe´ratifs avec paralle´lisme,
calculs de processus, bisimulation.
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1 Introduction
The issue of secure information flow has attracted a great deal of interest in recent years,
spurred by the spreading of mobile devices and nomadic computation. The question has
been studied in some depth both for programming languages (see [26] for a review) and
for process calculi [24, 7, 13, 21, 10, 14, 11, 5, 17, 9]. In the following we shall speak of
“language-based security” when referring to programming languages, and of “process-based
security” when referring to process calculi.
The language-based approach is concerned with secret data not being leaked by programs,
that is, with the security property of confidentiality. This property is usually formalized
via the notion of noninterference (NI), stating that secret inputs of programs should not
influence their public outputs, since this could allow - at least in principle - a public user to
reconstruct secret information.
The process-based approach, on the other hand, is concerned with secret actions of pro-
cesses not being publicly observable. Although bearing a clear analogy with the language-
based approach - security levels are assigned in both cases to information carriers, respec-
tively variables and channels - the process-based approach does not rely on quite the same
simple intuition. Indeed, there are several choices as to what an observer can gather by
communicating with a process. This is reflected in the variety of NI properties that have
been proposed for process calculi, mostly based on trace equivalence, testing or bisimulation
(cf [7] for a review). In general, these properties do not make a distinction between the
flow of data and the flow of control: indeed, these two kinds of flow are closely intertwined
in process calculi. Let us consider some examples to illustrate this point.
In the calculus CCS, an input process a(x). P receives a value v on channel a and then
behaves like P{v/x}. Symmetrically, an output process a〈e〉. P emits the value of expression
e on channel a and then behaves like P . Then a typical insecure data flow is the following,
where subscripts indicate the security level of channels (h meaning “high” or “secret”, and
ℓ meaning “low” or “public”):
geth(x). putℓ〈x〉
Here a value received on a high channel is retransmitted on a low channel. Since the value
for x may be obtained from some high external source, this process is considered insecure.
However, there are other cases where low output actions carry no data, or carry data that
do not originate from a high source, as in:
geth(x). doneℓ geth(x). putℓ〈v〉
where doneℓ is a low channel without parameters and v is a constant value. Although these
processes do not directly transfer data from high to low level, they are considered insecure
because they can be used to implement indirect insecure flows, as in the following process
(where x is assumed to be boolean and channels cℓ and dℓ are restricted and thus can be
used only for internal synchronisations):
P = ( (geth(x). if x then dℓ else cℓ) | (dℓ. putℓ〈0〉 + cℓ. putℓ〈1〉) ) \ {cℓ, dℓ}
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This process is insecure because, depending on the value received for x on the high channel
geth, it will perform two different synchronisations, followed by emissions of different values
on the low channel putℓ. Note that the first component of P is more elaborate than the
process geth(x). doneℓ above, since after receiving a value for x it performs a test on it.
The following variants of process P , where a high input without parameters is followed
by a low output, are similarly insecure:
P ′ = ( (geth(x). if x then dh else ch) | (dh. putℓ〈0〉 + ch. putℓ〈1〉) ) \ {ch, dh}
P ′′ = ( (geth(x). if x then dh else 0) | dh. putℓ〈0〉) \ {dh}
These examples suggest a simple criterion for enforcing noninterference on CCS, namely
that high actions should not be followed by low actions. Admittedly, this requirement is very
strong and it is easy to find processes which do not meet it and yet satisfy noninterference.
However, this criterion may serve, and indeed has been used, as a basis for defining security
type systems for process calculi. This brings us to the question of methods and tools for
ensuring NI properties.
In the language-based approach, theoretical results have often lead to the design of tools
for verifying security properties and to the development of secure implementations. Most of
the languages that have been studied so far have been equipped with a type system or some
other tool to enforce the compliance of programs with the desired security property (see for
instance [19, 20, 23, 22]).
By contrast, the process-based approach has remained at a more theoretical level. Type
systems for variants of the π-calculus, which combine the control of security with other
correctness concerns, have been proposed by Hennessy et al. in [10, 11] and by Honda et
al. in [13, 14]. A purely security type system for the π-calculus was presented by Pottier
in [21]. More recently, different security type systems for the π-calculus were studied by
Crafa and Rossi [9] and by Kobayashi [17]. This last work provides a sophisticated security
analysis, together with a type inference algorithm for it. Other static verification methods
have been proposed for a variant of CCS in [5].
We address the question of unifying the language-based and process-based approaches,
by relating both their security notions and the associated type systems. A first step in this
direction was taken by Honda, Vasconcelos and Yoshida in [13], where a parallel imperative
language was embedded into a typed π-calculus. This work was pursued by Honda and
Yoshida in [14], where more powerful languages, both imperative and functional, were con-
sidered. In [8], Focardi, Rossi and Sabelfeld showed that a variant of Milner’s translation of
a sequential imperative language into CCS preserves a time-sensitive NI property, by map-
ping it to the property of Persistent Bisimulation-based Non Deducibility on Compositions
(PBNDC), introduced by Focardi and Rossi in [6]. However, since CCS was not equipped
with a security type system, the question of type preservation could not be addressed.
Taking [8] as our starting point, we extend its result by showing that a simpler variant
of Milner’s translation preserves a time-insensitive NI property on a parallel imperative
language, by mapping it again to PBNDC. As a by-product, we show that the translation
preserves a behavioural equivalence on programs (this was a kind of folklore result). We
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also propose a type system for ensuring PBNDC, inspired by the type systems of [21, 10, 11]
for the π-calculus. Unfortunately, this type system is too restrictive as it stands to reflect
any of the known type systems for the source language. However, it can be used as a basis
to derive a suitable type system, which is briefly sketched here.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we recall the definitions of the
properties of BNDC and PBNDC for CCS and we present a type system ensuring the latter.
In Section 3 we review Milner’s translation of a parallel imperative language into CCS, and
adapt it in order to make it preserve a time-insensitive NI property, as well as a behavioural
equivalence. We then show that the translation does not preserve types, and conclude with
a discussion about type preservation and related work.
2 A simple security type system for CCS
In this section we present a simple security type system for the calculus CCS, similar to
those proposed for the π-calculus by Pottier [21] and by Hennessy and Riely [10, 11]. We
prove that this type system ensures the security property of Persistent Bisimulation-based
Non Deducibility on Compositions (PBNDC), introduced by Focardi and Rossi in [6] and
further studied in [5, 8, 9].
2.1 The process calculus CCS
Our chosen process calculus is CCS with value passing and guarded sums. We start by
recalling the main definitions. We assume a countable set of channels or names N , ranged
over by a, b, c, with the usual notational conventions for input and output. Similarly, let
V ar be a countable set of variables, disjoint from N and ranged over by x, y, z, and V al be
the set of data values, ranged over by v, v′. We define Exp, ranged over by e, e′, to be the
set of boolean and arithmetic expressions built from values and variables using the standard
total operations. Finally, we let val : Exp→ V al be the evaluation function for expressions,
satisfying val(v) = v for any value v. We will use the notation ~x (resp. ~v or ~e) to denote a
sequence 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 (resp. a sequence 〈v1, . . . , vn〉 or 〈e1, . . . , en〉).
The syntax of process prefixes, ranged over by π, π′, is given by:
π ::= a(x) | a〈e〉 | a | a
Simple prefixes of the form a and a will be used in examples but omitted from our technical
treatment, since they are a simpler case of a(x) and a〈e〉.
To define recursive processes, we assume a countable set I = {A,B, . . .} of parametric
process identifiers, each of which is supposed to have a fixed arity. We then define the set
of parametric terms, ranged over by T, T ′, as follows:
T ::= A | (recA(x˜) . P )
where P is a CCS process, whose syntax is defined below.
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A term (recA(x˜) . P ) is supposed to satisfy some standard requirements: (1) all variables
in ~x are distinct; (2) the length of ~x is equal to the arity of A; (3) all free variables of P
belong to ~x; (4) no free process identifier other than A occurs in P ; (5) recursion is guarded:
all occurrences of A in P appear under a prefix.
The set Pr of processes, ranged over by P,Q,R, is now given by:
P,Q ::=
∑
i∈I πi.Pi | (P | Q) | (νa)P | T (~e)
where I is an indexing set. We use 0 as an abbreviation for the empty sum
∑
i∈∅ πi.Pi.
Also, we abbreviate a unary sum
∑
i∈{1} πi.Pi to π1.P1 and a binary sum
∑
i∈{1,2} πi.Pi
to (π1.P1 + π2.P2). In a process A(~e) or (rec A(x˜) . P )(~e), the length of ~e is assumed to
be equal to the arity of A. Finally, if ~a = 〈a1, . . . , an〉, with ai 6= aj for i 6= j, the term
(νa1) · · · (νan)P is abbreviated to (ν~a)P . If K = {a1, . . . , an}, we sometimes render (ν~a)P
simply as (νK)P , or use the original CCS notation P \K, especially in examples.
The set of free variables (resp. free process identifiers) of process P will be denoted by
fv (P ) (resp. fid (P )). We use P{v/x} for the substitution of the variable x by the value v
in P . Also, if ~x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 and ~v = 〈v1, . . . , vn〉, we denote by P{~v/~x} the substitution
of each variable xi by the value vi in P . Finally, P{T/A} stands for the substitution of the
parametric term T for the identifier A in P .
The semantics of processes is given by labelled transitions of the form P
α
−→P ′. Transi-
tions are labelled by actions α, β, γ, which are elements of the set:
Act
def
= {av : a ∈ N , v ∈ V al} ∪ {a¯v : a ∈ N , v ∈ V al} ∪ {τ}
The subject of a prefix is defined by subj (a(x)) = subj (a〈e〉) = a, and the subject of an
action by subj (av) = subj (a¯v) = a and subj (τ) = τ . The complementation operation is
extended to input and output actions by letting av = a¯v and a¯v = av.
The operational semantics of processes is defined in Figure 1. A nondeterministic sum∑
i∈I πi.Pi executes one of its summands πi.Pi, simultaneously discarding the others. A
summand a(x). Pi receives a value v on channel a and then replaces it for x in Pi. A
summand a〈e〉. Pi emits the value of expression e on channel a and then becomes Pi. The
parallel composition P | Q interleaves the executions of P and Q, possibly synchronising
them on complementary actions to yield a τ -action. The restriction (νb)P behaves like P
where actions on channel b are forbidden. Finally, a recursive process behaves like its body
where each occurrence of the process identifier is replaced by the process definition.
2.2 Security properties for CCS
We now review two security properties for CCS: Bisimulation-based Non Deducibility on
Compositions (BNDC), introduced by Focardi and Gorrieri in [7] and then reformulated by
Focardi and Rossi [6], and Persistent Bisimulation-based Non Deducibility on Compositions
(PBNDC), proposed in [6] as a strenghtening of BNDC, better suited to deal with dynamic
contexts.
INRIA
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(SUM-OP1)
∑
i∈I πi.Pi
av
−→Pi{v/x}, if πi = a(x) and v ∈ V al
(SUM-OP2)
∑
i∈I πi.Pi
av
−→Pi , if πi = a〈e〉 and val(e) = v
(PAR-OP1)
P
α
−→P ′
P | Q
α
−→P ′ | Q
(PAR-OP2)
Q
α
−→Q′
P | Q
α
−→P | Q′
(PAR-OP3)
P
α
−→P ′ Q
α
−→Q′
P | Q
τ
−→P ′ | Q′
(RES-OP)
P
α
−→P ′ b 6= subj (α)
(νb)P
α
−→ (νb)P ′
(REC-OP)
P{~v/~x}{ (recA(x˜) . P ) /A }
α
−→P ′ ~v = val(~e)
(recA(x˜) . P )(~e)
α
−→P ′
Figure 1: Operational Semantics of CCS Processes
We start by recalling the definition of weak bisimulation. We adopt the usual notational
conventions:
❼ For any α ∈ Act, let P
α
=⇒P ′
def
= P
τ
−→
∗ α
−→
τ
−→
∗
P ′
❼ For any α ∈ Act, let P
αˆ
=⇒P ′
def
=
{
P
α
=⇒P ′ if α 6= τ
P
τ
−→
∗
P ′ if α = τ
Thus P
τ
=⇒P ′ requires at least one τ -transition while P
τˆ
=⇒P ′ allows for the empty move.
Definition 2.1 (Weak Bisimulation) A symmetric relation S ⊆ (Pr × Pr) is a weak
bisimulation if P S Q implies, for any α ∈ Act:
If P
α
−→P ′ then there exists Q′ such that Q
αˆ
=⇒Q′ and P ′ S Q′.
Then P and Q are weakly bisimilar, noted P ≈ Q, if P S Q for some weak bisimulation S.
It is well known that ≈ is the largest weak bisimulation and an equivalence relation.
To set up the scenario for BNDC, we need a few more assumptions and definitions.
Definition 2.2 (High and low channels) The set N of channels is partitioned into a
subset of high (secret) channels H and a subset of low (public) channels L.
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Input and output actions are then defined to be high or low according to the level of their
supporting channel. No security level is given to τ -actions.
We shall distinguish a particular subset of processes:
Definition 2.3 (Syntactically high processes w.r.t. H)
The set of syntactically high processes with respect to H, denoted PrH
syn
, is the set of processes
that contain only channels in H.
Note that PrH
syn
is a syntactic notion, which can be defined inductively. We shall later intro-
duce a semantic notion of high process, defined coinductively, which will be more permissive.
The property of Bisimulation-based Non Deducibility on Compositions (BNDC) of [7], in
its reformulation given by Focardi and Rossi [6], is now defined as follows (remember that
(νH)P stands for the restriction of P with respect to H):
Definition 2.4 (BNDCH) Let P ∈ Pr and H ⊆ N be the set of high channels. Then P is
secure with respect to H, P ∈ BNDCH, if for every process Π ∈ Pr
H
syn
, (νH)(P | Π) ≈ (νH)P .
When there is no ambiguity, we shall simply write BNDC instead of BNDCH. The intuition
behind BNDC is that the low observation of a process P should not be affected by any
interaction that P could have with a high environment.
Let us point out two typical sources of insecurity :
1. Insecurity may appear when a high name is followed by a low name in process P , as in
P = ah. bℓ, because in this case the execution of (νH)P may block on the high name,
making the low name unreachable, while it is always possible to find a high process Π
that makes the low name reachable in (νH)(P | Π). In this example, choosing Π = ah,
one obtains (νH)(P | Π) 6≈ (νH)P .
2. Insecurity may also appear when a high name is in conflict with a low name, that is,
when they occur in different branches of a sum, as in P = ah + bℓ. Indeed, in this
case the conflict is “masked” in the process (νH)P , while it can be solved in favour of
ah in (νH)(P | Π). Indeed, by taking again Π = ah one gets (νH)(P | Π) 6≈ (νH)P ,
since the first process can do a silent move
τ
−→ leading to a state equivalent to 0,
which the second process cannot match. Note on the other hand that Q = ah. bℓ + bℓ
is secure, because in this case the synchronisation on channel ah in (νH)(Q | Π) may
be simulated by inaction in (νH)Q. Note finally that the process:
R = ah. ch. bℓ + bℓ
is insecure, because for Π = ah we get (νH)(R | Π) 6≈ (νH)R, since (νH)(R | Π) can
do a silent move to the deadlocked state (νH)(ch. bℓ), which (νH)R cannot match.
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In [6], Focardi and Rossi showed that BNDC is not strong enough to deal with dynamic
contexts, and proposed a more robust property called Persistent Bisimulation-based Non
Deducibility on Compositions (PBNDC).
To define PBNDC, a new transition relation
∼
α
=⇒H is required, defined as follows for any
α ∈ Act:
P
∼
α
=⇒H P
′ def=
{
P
αˆ
=⇒P ′ or P
τ
−→
∗
P ′ if subj (α) ∈ H
P
αˆ
=⇒P ′ otherwise
The transition relation
∼
α
=⇒H is used to define a notion of bisimulation which allows simu-
lation of high actions by inaction or τ -actions:
Definition 2.5 (Weak bisimulation up-to-high)
A symmetric relation S ⊆ (Pr × Pr) is a weak bisimulation up to high if P S Q implies,
for any α ∈ Act:
If P
α
−→P ′ then there exists Q′ such that Q
∼
α
=⇒HQ
′ and P ′ S Q′.
Two processes P,Q are weakly bisimilar up to high, written P ≈H Q, if P S Q for some
weak bisimulation up to high S.
Finally, the property of PBNDC is defined as follows:
Definition 2.6 (PBNDCH) Let P ∈ Pr and H ⊆ N be a set of high names. Then P is said
to be persistently secure with respect to H, P ∈ PBNDCH, if P ≈H (νH)P .
Note that, since (νH)P cannot perform high actions, the relation ≈H is essentially used
in the definition of PBNDC to allow high moves of P to be simulated by (possibly empty)
sequences of τ -moves of (νH)P .
It was shown in [6] that PBNDC is stronger than BNDC, and that requiring PBNDC for
P amounts to requiring BNDC for all reachable states of P (whence the name “persistent”).
Intuitively, this is because the quantification over high environments which appears in the
definition of BNDC is (implicitly) replaced in the definition of PBNDC by plugging P into a
“universal” high environment, capable of persistently matching any high move of P (which
in turn corresponds to plugging P in a new arbitrary high environment at each step).
All the examples considered above are treated in the same way by BNDC and PBNDC.
To illustrate the difference between the two notions, we give an example of a process which
is secure but not persistently secure. This example is taken from [6] (with a little variation
due to the fact that τ -prefixes are not allowed in our syntax, so we need to encode them
with parallel composition and restriction).
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Example 2.1 (Secure but not persistently secure process)
The process P = P1 + P2 = aℓ. bh. cℓ + aℓ. (νdℓ)(dℓ | dℓ. cℓ | dℓ) is not persistently
secure since its reachable state bh. cℓ is not secure. On the other hand P is secure, as
it may be seen by choosing Π = bh, which is the only candidate for detecting insecurity,
and proving that (νH)(P | Π) ≈ (νH)P . Indeed, if either of the two processes chooses
to execute the second summand P2, reducing it to P
′
2 = (νdℓ)(dℓ | dℓ. cℓ | dℓ), the other
process can reply with exactly the same move, since P ′2 does not contain high channels and
thus the residuals (νH)(P ′2 | Π) and (νH)P
′
2 are trivially equivalent. If on the other hand
(νH)(P | Π) chooses to execute the first summand P1, reducing it to P
′
1 = bh. cℓ, then
(νH)P can reply by the sequence of moves
aℓ−→
τ
−→ of P2, where the τ corresponds to the
first synchronisation, since the respective residuals (νH)(P ′1 | Π) and (νH)(νdℓ)(0 | cℓ | dℓ)
are both equivalent to cℓ. Conversely, if (νH)P chooses to execute the first summand P1
reducing it to P ′1, then (νH)(P | Π) can reply by the sequence of moves
aℓ−→
τ
−→ of P2,
where the τ corresponds now to the second synchronisation, since the respective residuals
(νH)P ′1 and (νH)(νdℓ)((0 | dℓ. cℓ | 0) | Π) are both equivalent to 0.
2.3 A security type system for PBNDC
In this section we present a security type system for CCS, which ensures the property of
PBNDC. This type system can be viewed as the reduction to CCS of the security type
systems proposed for the π-calculus by Pottier [21] and by Hennessy et al. [10, 11].
Security levels, ranged over by δ, θ, σ, are defined as usual to form a lattice (T ,≤), where
the order relation ≤ stands for “less secret than”. Here we assume the lattice to be simply
{l, h}, with l ≤ h, to match the partition of the set of channels into L and H. However all
our results about the type system would hold for an arbitrary lattice of security levels.
A type environment Γ is a mapping from channels to security levels, together with a par-
tial mapping from process identifiers to security levels (this second part of the environment
is needed to type recursive processes). This mapping is extended to prefixes and visible
actions by letting Γ(π) = Γ(subj (π)) and for any α 6= τ , Γ(α) = Γ(subj (α)).
Type judgements for processes have the form Γ ⊢σ P . Intuitively, Γ ⊢σ P means that in
the type environment Γ, σ is a lower bound on the security level of channels occurring in P .
The typing rules for CCS are given in Figure 2. Let us discuss the most interesting ones.
(Sum) This rule imposes a strong constraint on processes
∑
i∈I πi.Pi, namely that all pre-
fixes πi have the same security level σ and that the Pi have themselves type σ. In fact,
since each judgement Γ ⊢σ Pi may have been derived using subtyping, this means that
originally Γ ⊢σi Pi, for some σi such that σ ≤ σi. Consider for instance the process
P = aℓ. bℓ + aℓ. ch. Then rule (Sum) yields Γ ⊢ℓ P because, assuming Γ is the type
environment specified by the subscripts, we have Γ(π1) = Γ(π2) = ℓ, as well as Γ ⊢ℓ P1
and Γ ⊢ℓ P2, where the latter judgement is deduced using rule (Sub) from Γ ⊢h P2.
Note that, as expected, processes ah. bℓ and ah+bℓ are not typable. On the other hand,
it should be pointed out that the process ah. bℓ+ bℓ, which was argued to be secure at
page 8, is not typable either. Hence (Sum) is stricter than we would wish. In order
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(Sum) (Par)
∀i ∈ I : Γ(πi) = σ Γ ⊢σ Pi
Γ ⊢σ
∑
i∈I πi.Pi
Γ ⊢σ P Γ ⊢σ Q
Γ ⊢σ P | Q
(Res) (Sub)
Γ, b : θ ⊢σ P
Γ ⊢σ (νb)P
Γ ⊢σ P σ
′ ≤ σ
Γ ⊢σ′ P
(Rec1) (Rec2)
Γ(A) = σ
Γ ⊢σ A(e˜)
Γ, A : σ ⊢σ P
Γ ⊢σ (recA(x˜) . P )(e˜)
Figure 2: Type system for CCS
to make process ah. bℓ+ bℓ typable, we could replace rule (Sum) by a more permissive
rule (Sum-Lax), which allows a prefix πi to be of level higher than ℓ, provided its
continuation process Pi is indistinguishable from the original sum process:
(Sum-Lax)
∀i ∈ I : Γ ⊢σ Pi ∧ ( Γ(πi) = σ ∨ ( Γ(πi) > σ ∧ Pi ≈H
∑
i∈I πi.Pi))
Γ ⊢σ
∑
i∈I πi.Pi
Note that rule (Sum-Lax) makes use of the semantic equivalence ≈H, and hence is
not completely static. We shall come back to this rule later in the paper. For the time
being, we shall stick to the more classical type system of Figure 2.
Note finally that it would not have been clear how to deal with the full CCS language,
that is, with arbitrary sums rather than just guarded sums. Consider for instance the
process aℓ + (bh | cℓ). The second summand has type ℓ by rule (Par). Then, if rule
(Sum) were generalised to full CCS by requiring each summand to have the same type,
this process, which is clearly insecure, would be typable with type ℓ.
(Rec2) This rule states that, in order to give type σ to the body P of a recursive process
recA(x˜) . P , and hence to the whole process, it is necessary to assume that the identifier
A itself has type σ. Rule (Rec1) is used to type instantiated process identifiers and
to prove the hypothesis of rule (Rec2).
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Some simple properties of this type system can immediately be established.
Lemma 2.2 (Substitution preserves types) Let P ∈ Pr. Then:
1. If Γ ⊢σ P , then for any v ∈ V al and x ∈ fv (P ), Γ ⊢σ P{v/x}.
2. If Γ, A : σ ⊢σ P and Q ∈ Pr is such that Γ ⊢σ Q, then Γ ⊢σ P{Q/A}.
Theorem 2.3 (Subject reduction)
For any P ∈ Pr, if Γ ⊢σ P and P
α
−→P ′ then Γ ⊢σ P
′.
Proof By induction on the inference of Γ ⊢σ P . The proof is reported in the Appendix. ✷
We proceed now to establish the soundness of the above type system for the property
of PBNDCon CCS. To this end, we need a number of preliminary results. The first one
corresponds to the property usually called confinement in imperative languages [32]. It
states that types have the intended meaning.
Lemma 2.4 (Confinement)
Let P ∈ Pr and Γ ⊢σ P . If P
α
−→P ′ and α 6= τ then Γ(α) ≥ σ.
Proof By induction on the proof of Γ ⊢σ P . The proof may be found in the Appendix. ✷
There is a set of processes for which the security property is particularly easy to establish
because of their inability to perform low actions. These are the semantically high processes,
which can be defined either relatively to a partition {L,H} of the set of channels N , or with
respect to a type environment Γ.
Definition 2.7 (Semantically high processes w.r.t. H)
Let H ⊆ N . Then the set of semantically high processes with respect to H, denoted PrH
sem
, is
the largest set such that P ∈ PrH
sem
implies:
For any α ∈ Act, if P
α
−→P ′ then α = τ or subj (α) ∈ H, and P ′ ∈ PrH
sem
.
Definition 2.8 (Semantically high processes w.r.t. Γ)
Let Γ be a type environment. The set of semantically high programs with respect to Γ,
denoted PrΓ
sem
, is the largest set such that P ∈ PrΓ
sem
implies:
For any α ∈ Act, if P
α
−→P ′ then α = τ or Γ(α) = h, and P ′ ∈ PrΓ
sem
.
Fact 2.5 Let H = { a ∈ N : Γ(a) = h }. Then PrH
sem
= PrΓ
sem
.
Lemma 2.6 Let P ∈ Pr and Γ ⊢h P . Then P ∈ Pr
Γ
sem
.
Proof By Lemma 2.4 and Theorem 2.3. ✷
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Lemma 2.7 (≈H – equivalence of semantically high processes)
Let P,Q ∈ PrH
sem
. Then P ≈H Q.
Proof We show that S = { (P,Q) : P,Q ∈ PrH
sem
} is a weak bisimulation up to high. Let
P
α
−→P ′. Since P ∈ PrH
sem
, we know that P ′ ∈ PrH
sem
and either α = τ or subj (α) ∈ H. In
both cases we can choose Q
τ
−→
∗
Q as the matching move. ✷
Lemma 2.8 (Persistent security of semantically high processes)
Let P ∈ PrH
sem
. Then P ≈H (νH)P .
Proof Since P ∈ PrH
sem
implies (νH)P ∈ PrH
sem
, the result follows by Lemma 2.7. ✷
We prove now an important property of typable programs, which will be the key for our
soundness proof.
Lemma 2.9 (≈H – invariance under high actions)
Let P ∈ Pr, Γ ⊢σ P and H = { a ∈ N : Γ(a) = h }. If P
α
−→P ′ and Γ(α) = h then
P ≈H P
′.
Proof (Outline) Let S be the binary relation on Pr defined inductively as follows:
(P,Q) ∈ S if and only if there exist Γ and σ such that Γ ⊢σ P , Γ ⊢σ Q and, letting
H = { a ∈ N : Γ(a) = h }, one of the following holds:
1. P ≈H Q
2. P,Q ∈ PrH
sem
3. P
α
−→Q or Q
α
−→P for some α such that Γ(α) = h
4. P = P1 | P2, Q = Q1 | Q2 and (Pi, Qi) ∈ S for i = 1, 2
5. There exists R such that Γ ⊢σ R, (P,R) ∈ S and (R,Q) ∈ S
6. P = (νb)R, Q = (νb)S and there exists θ such that Γ∪{(b, θ)} ⊢σ R, Γ∪{(b, θ)} ⊢σ S,
and (R,S) ∈ S
7. P = (recA(x˜) . R)(e˜) and (R{v˜/x˜}{ (recA(x˜) . R) /A }, Q) ∈ S, with v˜ = val(e˜)
It can be shown that S is a weak bisimulation up to high, by induction on the definition of
S. We have to show that for any pair (P,Q) ∈ S, processes P and Q can do the same weak
transitions “up to high” (for the given H), leading to derivatives which are again related by
S. The detailed proof is given in the Appendix. ✷
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Corollary 2.10 (Compositionality of ≈H for typable programs)
Let P,Q,R ∈ Pr and Γ be a type environment such that Γ ⊢σ P , Γ ⊢σ Q and Γ ⊢σ R .Then,
if P ≈H Q, also P | R ≈H Q | R.
Proof It follows from the proof of Lemma 2.9, since the relation S introduced in that proof
contains the pair (P | R, Q | R) and is such that S ⊆ ≈H. ✷
It should be noted that ≈H is not preserved by parallel composition on arbitrary programs,
as shown by the following example where Pi ≈H Qi for i = 1, 2 but P1 | P2 6≈H Q1 | Q2:
P1 = ah Q1 = 0 P2 = Q2 = bℓ + ah
It is easy to see that P1 | P2 6≈H Q1 | Q2 because P1 | P2 can perform a τ -action leading
to 0, which Q1 | Q2 cannot match: indeed, Q1 | Q2 cannot reply by the empty move
because this would not discard the low action bℓ (nor can it reply by the high action ah,
since this is not allowed by ≈H). Note that P2 is not typable, because it does not meet the
requirements of rule (Sum). Indeed, P2 is insecure. Let us point out that, although ≈H is
not compositional, the property of PBNDC itself is compositional, as shown in [6].
We may now prove our main result, namely that typability implies PBNDC.
Theorem 2.11 (Soundness)
If P ∈ Pr and Γ ⊢σ P then P ≈H (νH)P , where H = { a ∈ N : Γ(a) = h }.
Proof We show that the following relation is a weak bisimulation up to high (then the
result will follow since (P, (νH)P ) belongs to this relation):
S = { (P, (νH)Q ) : Γ ⊢σ P, Γ ⊢σ Q, H = { a ∈ N : Γ(a) = h }, P ≈H Q}
From P ≈H Q, it follows that P can match the moves of (νH)Q, since these are a subset
of those of Q. Note that subject reduction is used here, since the derivatives must have the
same type σ. We consider the other direction.
Let P
α
−→P ′. There are two cases to consider:
❼ Suppose subj (α) ∈ L or subj (α) = τ . From P ≈H Q, it follows that there exists Q
′
such that Q
∼
α
=⇒HQ
′ and P ′ ≈H Q
′. Then also (νH)Q
∼
α
=⇒H (νH)Q
′. Since Γ ⊢σ P
′
and Γ ⊢σ Q
′ by subject reduction, we get (P ′, (νH)Q′) ∈ S.
❼ Suppose now subj (α) ∈ H. Then P ≈H P
′ by Lemma 2.9 and thus also P ′ ≈H Q. By
subject reduction Γ ⊢σ P
′. Then (P ′, (νH)Q) ∈ S, thus (νH)Q can match the move
P
α
−→P ′ by the empty move (νH)Q
τ
−→
∗
(νH)Q.
✷
This concludes, for the time being, our discussion about noninterference and types for
CCS. We shall turn now our attention to a language for parallel imperative programs.
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3 Translating parallel imperative programs into CCS
Our aim is to establish a correspondence between language-based NI and process-based
NI, and between the associated type systems. We focus on the simple parallel imperative
language studied by Smith and Volpano in [30]. Since this is essentially the language IMP
considered by Winskel in [34], extended with a parallel operator, we shall call it PARIMP.
Several NI properties and related type systems have already been proposed for PARIMP,
e.g. [27, 1, 29, 4], inspired from the pioneering work by Volpano, Smith et al. [32, 30, 31].
In the previous section we have studied a type system for CCS, ensuring the property of
PBNDC. The next step is to devise a mapping from PARIMP to CCS, which preserves both
a chosen NI property and the associated typing. Now, there exists a well known translation
of PARIMP into CCS, given by Milner in [18]. In [8], Focardi, Rossi and Sabelfeld showed
that a variant of Milner’s translation preserves – by mapping it to PBNDC– a time-sensitive
notion of NI for IMP, the sequential fragment of PARIMP. We shall be concerned here with
the full language PARIMP, and with a time-insensitive NI property for this language1. We
will show that this property is preserved by a simpler variant of Milner’s translation.
3.1 The imperative language PARIMP
In this section we recall the syntax and semantics of the language PARIMP, and we define
our property of security, a time-insensitive NI property inspired from [4].
We assume a countable set of variables ranged over by X,Y, Z, a set of values ranged
over by V, V ′, and a set of expressions ranged over by E,E′ 2. Formally, expressions are
built using total functions F,G, . . . , which we assume to be in a 1 to 1 correspondence with
the functions f, g, . . . used to build CCS expressions:
E ::= F (X1, . . . , Xn)
The set C of programs or commands, ranged over by C,D, is given by:
C, D ::= nil | X := E | C ; D | (if E then C else D) |
(while E do C) | (C ‖ D)
The operational semantics of the language is given in terms of transitions between con-
figurations 〈C, s〉 → 〈C ′, s′〉 where C,C ′ are programs and s, s′ are states or memories, that
is, mappings from a finite subset of variables to values. These mappings are extended in the
obvious way to expressions, whose evaluation is assumed to be terminating and atomic. We
use the notation s[V/X] for memory update, 7→ for the reflexive closure of →, and →∗ for
the reflexive and transitive closure of →. The operational rules for configurations are given
in Figure 3. These rules are mostly standard, thus we shall not comment about them. Let
1Note that PBNDC is itself time-insensitive.
2In general, we shall use uppercase letters for syntactic categories of PARIMP, in order to distinguish
them from those of CCS.
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us just remark that rules (Seq-Op2), (ParL-Op2) and (ParR-Op2) are introduced, as
in [3], to allow every terminated configuration to take the form 〈nil, s〉3.
A configuration 〈C, s〉 is well-formed if fv (C) ⊆ dom(s). It is easy to see, by inspection
of the rules, that 〈C, s〉 → 〈C ′, s′〉 implies fv (C ′) ⊆ fv (C) and dom(s′) = dom(s), hence
well-formedness is preserved by execution.
As for CCS, we assume a partition of the set of variables into a set of low variables L
and a set of high variables H. In examples, we shall use the subscripts L and H for variables
belonging to the sets L and H, respectively. We may now introduce the notions of low
equality and low-bisimulation, on which the definition of security is based.
Definition 3.1 (L-Equality) Two memories s and t are L-equal, written s =L t, if
dom(s) = dom(t) and (X ∈ dom(s) ∩ L ⇒ s(X) = t(X)).
Definition 3.2 (L-Bisimulation)
A symmetric relation S ⊆ (C×C) is a L-bisimulation if C SD implies, for any pair of states
s and t such that s =L t and 〈C, s〉 and 〈D, t〉 are well-formed:
If 〈C, s〉 → 〈C ′, s′〉, then there exist D′, t′ such that
〈D, t〉 7→ 〈D′, t′〉 and s′ =L t
′ and C ′ S D′.
Two programs C,D are L-bisimilar, C ≃L D, if C S D for some L-bisimulation S.
Note that the simulating program is required to mimic each move of the first program by
either one or zero moves. In particular, if the first program modifies the low part of s, then
the simulating program must modify the low part of t (and thus perform a proper move), in
order to meet the condition s′ =L t
′. If on the other hand the first program does not touch
the low part of s, i.e. s′ =L s, then the second program may reply by staying idle. In this
sense, the relation ≃L is time-insensitive. It is also termination-insensitive, as it relates any
two programs which do not modify the low state, as for instance nil and (while tt do nil).
This notion of low-bisimulation is inspired from [4]. We could have chosen a weaker notion,
where 7→ is replaced by→∗, as proposed in [27]. However our choice allows for a more precise
notion of security, which respects “low memory traces”, as illustrated by Example 3.1 below.
Definition 3.3 (L-Security) A program C is L-secure if C ≃L C.
When L is clear, we shall speak simply of low-equality, low-bisimulation and security.
Example 3.1 The following program, where loop D
def
= (while tt do D):
C = (if XH = 0 then loop (YL := 0 ; YL := 1) else loop (YL := 1 ; YL := 0))
is not L-secure since the branches of the conditional cannot simulate each other’s moves
in one or zero steps. However it would be secure according to the weaker notion of L-
bisimulation obtained by replacing 7→ with →∗ in Definition 3.2.
3In contrast, Rules (ParL-Op2) and (ParR-Op2) were not needed in [4], where the syntax was slightly
more restrictive, in that the first component of a process P ;Q was assumed to be sequential.
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(Assign-Op)
〈X := E, s〉 → 〈nil, s[s(E)/X]〉
(Seq-Op1)
〈C, s〉 → 〈C ′, s′〉
〈C;D, s〉 → 〈C ′;D, s′〉
(Seq-Op2)
〈nil;D, s〉 → 〈D, s〉
(Cond-Op1)
s(E) = tt
〈if E then C else D, s〉 → 〈C, s〉
(Cond-Op2)
s(E) 6= tt
〈if E then C else D, s〉 → 〈D, s〉
(While-Op1)
s(E) = tt
〈while E do C, s〉 → 〈C; while E do C, s〉
(While-Op2)
s(E) 6= tt
〈while E do C, s〉 → 〈nil, s〉
(ParL-Op1)
〈C, s〉 → 〈C ′, s′〉
〈C ‖ D, s〉 → 〈C ′ ‖ D, s′〉
(ParL-Op2)
〈nil ‖ D, s〉 → 〈D, s〉
(ParR-Op1)
〈D, s〉 → 〈D′, s′〉
〈C ‖ D, s〉 → 〈C ‖ D′, s′〉
(ParR-Op2)
〈C ‖ nil, s〉 → 〈C, s〉
Figure 3: Operational Semantics of PARIMP
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3.2 Milner’s translation of PARIMP into CCS
We review now Milner’s translation of the language PARIMP into CCS [18]. This translation
makes use of two new constructs of CCS, renaming and conditional, which were not present
in the language of Section 2. Their operational semantics is well-known and is recalled for
completeness in the Appendix.
First, in order to model the store one introduces registers. For each program variable X,
the associated register RegX , parameterised by the value it contains, is defined by:
RegX(v)
def
= putX(x).RegX(x) + getX〈v〉.RegX(v)
The translation [[s]] of a state s is then a pool of registers, given by :
[[s]] = RegX1(s(X1)) | · · · | RegXn(s(Xn)) if dom(s) = {X1, . . . , Xn}
In order to record the results of expression evaluation, a special channel res is introduced.
The translation [[E]] of an expression E = F (X1, . . . , Xn) is a process which collects the
values of registers RegX1 . . . , RegXn into the variables x1, . . . , xn and then transmits over
res the result of evaluating f(x1, . . . , xn), where f is the CCS function corresponding to the
PARIMP function F :
[[F (X1, . . . , Xn)]] = getX1(x1). · · · . getXn(xn). res〈f(x1, . . . , xn)〉.0
The channel res is used by the auxiliary operator Into, defined as follows, where the process
P is assumed to be the translation of an expression E:
P Into (x)Q
def
= (P | res(x). Q)\res
Finally, in order to model sequential composition in CCS, a distinguished channel done
is introduced, through which processes may signal their termination. Each process [[C]]
obtained from a command C will emit an action done upon termination. The idea is that,
in the translation of the sequential composition C ; D, the termination signal of [[C]] will
serve as a trigger for [[D]].
The channel done is used by the auxiliary operators Done,Before and Par, which are
defined as follows, assuming d, d1, d2 to be new names:
Done
def
= done.0
C BeforeD
def
= (C[d/done] | d.D)\d
C1 Par C2
def
= ((C1[d1/done] | C2[d2/done]) |
(d1. d2.Done+ d2. d1.Done))\{d1, d2}
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The translation of commands is then given by:
[[nil]] = Done
[[X := E]] = [[E]] Into (x) (putX〈x〉.Done)
[[C ; D]] = [[C]] Before [[D]]
[[(if E then C1 else C2)]] = [[E]] Into (x) (if x then [[C1]] else [[C2]])
[[(while E do C)]] = W, where W
def
= [[E]] Into (x)
(if x then [[C]] Before W else Done)
[[(C1 ‖ C2)]] = [[C1]]Par [[C2]]
The translation of a well-formed configuration 〈C, s〉 is defined as follows:
[[〈C, s〉]] = ( [[C]] | [[s]] ) \Accs ∪ {done}
where Accs is the access sort of state s, namely the set of channels by which processes access
variables in the domain of s:
Accs
def
= { getX , putX | X ∈ dom(s) }
3.3 Adapting the translation to preserve noninterference
As noted by Milner in [18], the translation just described does not preserve the atomicity
of assignment statements. Consider the program: C = (X := X + 1 ‖ X := X + 1). The
translation of C is (omitting trailing 0’s):
[[C]] = ( (getX(x). res〈x+ 1〉 | res(y). putX〈y〉. d1) \res
| (getX(x). res〈x+ 1〉 | res(y). putX〈y〉. d2) \res
| (d1. d2.Done+ d2. d1.Done) ) \ {d1, d2}
Here the second getX action may be executed before the first putX action. This means
that the same value v0 may be read for X in both assignments, and thus the same value
v1 = v0+1 may be assigned twice to X. Hence, while the original program only produces the
final value v2 = v0+2 for X, the target process may also produce the final value v1 = v0+1.
It is then easy to see that the translation does not preserve the security of programs.
Let CL = (XL := XL + 1 ‖ XL := XL + 1) and DL = (XL := XL + 1 ; XL := XL + 1).
Consider now the program Ĉ = (if zH = 0 then CL else DL). Clearly Ĉ is secure, since
each assignment is executed atomically in PARIMP. On the other hand [[Ĉ]] is not secure,
because, as we just saw, [[CL]] and [[DL]] may have different effects on the low memory.
To get around this example it would be enough to introduce a distinct semaphore for
each variable, which would prevent parallel writings into that variable. However this solution
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would not take care of the next example, where two parallel assignments modify different
variables (here we suppose X,Y to be boolean, so that X is the complement of X):
C ′ = (X := Y ‖ Y := X)
It is easy to see that, whatever the initial values of X and Y , the program C ′ will always end
up with different final values for X and Y . On the other hand, if overlapping of assignments
to different variables is allowed in the target language, then the process [[C ′]] can read the
initial values for X and Y in parallel and, in case they are equal, produce equal final values
for them. Let now C ′L = (XL := YL ‖ YL := XL), and let D
′
L be the (low-trace equivalent)
program4: D′L = (if random-bool then XL := YL else YL := XL). Then the program
Ĉ ′ = (if zH = 0 then C
′
L else D
′
L) is secure, while [[Ĉ
′]] is not.
To sum up, in order to preserve program security the translation should prevent the
ovelapping of (the images of) concurrent assignments. To ensure such mutual exclusion, we
introduce a global semaphore for the whole store:
Sem
def
= lock. unlock.Sem
The translation of the assignment statement and of well-formed configurations then becomes:
[[X := E]] = lock. [[E]] Into (x) (putX〈x〉. unlock.Done)
[[〈C, s〉]] = ( [[C]] | [[s]] | Sem ) \Accs ∪ {done, lock, unlock}
We show now that, in order to preserve security, the translation should additionally preserve
the atomicity of expression evaluation. Consider the couple of programs:
C1 = XL := 0 ; YL := 0 ;
(XL := 1 ; YL := 1 ‖ (if (XL = 0 ∧ YL = 1) then ZL := 0
else ZL := 1) )
C2 = XL := 0 ; YL := 0 ;
(XL := 1 ; YL := 1 ‖ (if ff then ZL := 0 else ZL := 1) )
It is easy to see that C1 and C2 are low-bisimilar, since the expression (XL = 0 ∧ YL = 1) is
evaluated atomically, yielding ff at each point of execution. On the other hand the process
[[C1]] can fetch the value for XL before the assignment XL := 1 and the value for YL after
the assignment YL := 1, in which case the expression evaluates to tt. Therefore [[C1]] is not
low-bisimilar to [[C2]]. Hence, if we put C1 and C2 in the branches of a high conditional,
as in the previous examples, we obtain a program which is secure, but whose translation is
insecure. This shows that expression evaluation should not overlap with assignments, and
4Here we use a random boolean value generator random-bool to simulate nondeterminism. Strictly
speaking, this program is not definable in our language.
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thus should be protected with the same semaphore Sem which is used for assignments. This
means that locks must be introduced also in the translation of conditionals and loops.
We examine two different ways of introducing locks in the translation of conditionals and
loops, the first being a simplication of that proposed by Focardi, Rossi and Sabelfeld in [8],
while the second is a slightly more structured variant of it.
Solution 1. The first revised translation of conditionals and loops is given by:
[[(if E then C1 else C2)]] = lock. [[E]] Into (x) ( if x then unlock. [[C1]]
else unlock. [[C2]] )
[[(while E do C)]] = W, where W
def
= lock. [[E]] Into (x)
(if x then unlock. [[C]] Before W else unlock.Done)
The first translation of PARIMP into CCS, based on Solution 1, is summarised in Figure 4.
This is essentially a simpler variant of the translation proposed in [8], where in addition
special tick actions were introduced in the translation of each statement, so as to recover
a direct correspondence between execution steps in 〈C, s〉 and their simulation in [[〈C, s〉]].
This was needed to obtain a full abstraction result for the translation, which would not have
held otherwise. We shall come back to this point in the discussion at the end of Section 3.4.
Solution 2. The second revised translation of conditionals and loops is based on the
idea of localising the use of locks, by using the lock and unlock actions as delimiters
around the translation of expression evaluation. Let getseqX˜(x˜) be an abbreviation for
getX1(x1). · · · . getXn(xn), and f(x˜) stand for f(x1, . . . , xn), as usual.
The atomic translation of expression E, denoted [[E]]at, is defined as follows:
[[F (X1, . . . , Xn)]]at = lock. getseqX˜(x˜). res〈f(x˜)〉. unlock.0
The translation of conditionals and loops is then simply adapted by replacing [[E]] by [[E]]at:
[[(if E then C1 else C2)]] = [[E]]at Into (x) (if x then [[C1]] else [[C2]])
[[(while E do C)]] = W, where W
def
= [[E]]at Into (x)
(if x then [[C]] Before W else Done)
The second translation of PARIMP into CCS, based on Solution 2, is given in Figure 5,
where for clarity we denote the translation by the symbol 〈[ ]〉 instead of [[ ]]. In the rest of
the paper, we shall deal only with the first translation, but all our results hold also for the
second translation, with some minor variations in the proofs, discussed in the Appendix.
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Semaphore:
Sem
def
= lock. unlock.Sem
Translation of states:
[[s]] = RegX1(s(X1)) | · · · | RegXn(s(Xn)) if dom(s) = {X1, . . . , Xn}
Translation of expressions:
[[F (X1, . . . , Xn)]] = getX1(x1). · · · . getXn(xn). res〈 f(x1, . . . , xn)〉.0
Translation of commands:
[[nil]] = Done
[[X := E]] = lock. [[E]] Into (x) (putX〈x〉. unlock.Done)
[[C ; D]] = [[C]] Before [[D]]
[[(if E then C1 else C2)]] = lock. [[E]] Into (x) ( if x then unlock. [[C1]]
else unlock. [[C2]] )
[[(while E do C)]] = W, where W
def
= lock. [[E]] Into (x)
(if x then unlock. [[C]] Before W else unlock.Done)
Translation of well-formed configurations 〈C, s〉:
[[〈C, s〉]] = ( [[C]] | [[s]] | Sem ) \Accs ∪ {done, lock, unlock}
Access sort of a state s:
Accs
def
= { getX , putX | X ∈ dom(s) }
Figure 4: Translation of PARIMP into CCS
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Semaphore:
Sem
def
= lock. unlock.Sem
Translation of states:
〈[s]〉 = RegX1(s(X1)) | · · · | RegXn(s(Xn)) if dom(s) = {X1, . . . , Xn}
Translation of expressions:
〈[F (X1, . . . , Xn)]〉 = getX1(x1). · · · . getXn(xn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
getseq
X˜
(x˜)
. res〈 f(x1, . . . , xn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(x˜)
〉.0
Atomic translation of expressions:
〈[F (X1, . . . , Xn)]〉at = lock. getseqX˜(x˜). res〈f(x˜)〉. unlock.0
Translation of commands:
〈[nil]〉 = Done
〈[X := E]〉 = lock. 〈[E]〉 Into (x) (putX〈x〉. unlock.Done)
〈[C ; D]〉 = 〈[C]〉 Before 〈[D]〉
〈[(if E then C1 else C2)]〉 = 〈[E]〉at Into (x) (if x then 〈[C1]〉 else 〈[C2]〉)
〈[(while E do C)]〉 = W, where W
def
= 〈[E]〉at Into (x)
(if x then 〈[C]〉 Before W else Done)
〈[(C1 ‖ C2)]〉 = 〈[C1]〉Par 〈[C2]〉
Translation of well-formed configurations 〈C, s〉:
〈[〈C, s〉]〉 = ( 〈[C]〉 | 〈[s]〉 | Sem ) \Accs ∪ {done, lock, unlock}
Access sort of a state s:
Accs
def
= { getX , putX | X ∈ dom(s) }
Figure 5: Alternative translation of PARIMP into CCS
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3.4 The translation preserves security
We show now that the translation described in Figure 4 preserves security. Such a result
is based, as usual, on an operational correspondence between programs (or more exactly,
configurations) in the source language and their images in the target language. In order
to relate the behaviour of a configuration 〈C, s〉 with the behaviour of its image, we must
provide a means to observe the changes performed by [[C]] on [[s]] in CCS5. To this end we
introduce, as in [25, 8], special channels dedicated to the exchange of data between processes
and the environment, which we call in and out: the environment uses channel inX to feed a
new value into register RegX , and channel outX to retrieve the current value of RegX . The
definition of registers is then modified as follows.
The observable register ORegX associated with variable X is defined by:
ORegX(v)
def
= putX(x). ORegX(x) + getX〈v〉. ORegX(v) +
lock. ( inX(x). unlock. ORegX(x) + unlock. ORegX(v) ) +
lock. ( outX〈v〉. unlock. ORegX(v) + unlock. ORegX(v) )
The locks around the inX(x) and outX〈v〉 prefixes are used to prevent the environment
from accessing the register while this is being used by some process. Note also that, after
committing to communicate with the environment by means of a lock action, an observable
register can always withdraw its commitment by doing an unlock action, and get back to
its initial state. This ensures that the pool of observable registers, when put in parallel with
the semaphore, is always weakly bisimilar to the image of some state s.
Assume now that each RegX is replaced by ORegX in the translation of Figure 4.
Suppose that channels putX , getX , inX , outX have the same security level as variable X,
and that channels lock, unlock, res and done are of high level. Suppose also that renaming
is only allowed between names of the same security level.
We may then show that the translation preserves security. Let us first establish the
operational correspondence between PARIMP programs and their images in CCS.
Notation: Let Env denote the set {inX , outX | X ∈ Var}. For conciseness, we shall
write ( [[C]] | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env instead of ( [[C]] | [[s]] | Sem ) \Accs ∪ {done, lock, unlock}.
Assume Env ⊆ N , and let ActEnv
def
= {α ∈ Act | subj (α) ∈ Env}. The actions of ActEnv
will be the only observable actions of processes obtained as images of configurations.
We now introduce labelled transitions
inXv−−−→ and
outXv−−−−→ for configurations6, as in [8]:
(In-Op)
X ∈ dom(s)
〈C, s〉
inXv−−−→ 〈C, s[v/X]〉
(Out-Op)
s(X) = v
〈C, s〉
outXv−−−−→ 〈C, s〉
5Note that, as it stands, the translation maps any configuration 〈C, s〉 to an unobservable CCS process.
6From now on, we shall use v, v′ to range over values in PARIMP as well as in CCS.
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Remark 3.2 By definition we have:
〈C, s〉
inXv−−−→ 〈C ′, s′〉 ⇔ (C ′ = C ∧ s′ = s[v/X] )
〈C, s〉
outXv−−−−→ 〈C ′, s′〉 ⇔ ( s(X) = v ∧ C ′ = C ∧ s′ = s )
We also extend τ -transitions to configurations by letting:
〈C, s〉
τ
−→〈C ′, s′〉 ⇔def 〈C, s〉 → 〈C
′, s′〉
We may now define weak labelled transitions 〈C, s〉
α
=⇒〈C ′, s′〉 on configurations, where
α ∈ ActEnv ∪ {τ}, exactly in the same way as for CCS processes.
The operational correspondence between well-formed configurations 〈C, s〉 and their im-
ages in CCS is then given by the following two Lemmas:
Lemma 3.3 (Program transitions are preserved by the translation)
Let 〈C, s〉 be a well-formed configuration and α ∈ ActEnv ∪ {τ}. Then:
1. If 〈C, s〉
α
−→〈C ′, s′〉, α 6= τ , then there exists P such that [[〈C, s〉]]
α
=⇒P = [[〈C ′, s′〉]].
2. If 〈C, s〉
τ
−→〈C ′, s′〉 then there exists P such that [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
=⇒P ≈ [[〈C ′, s′〉]].
Proof (Outline) The proof of Statement 1. is rather straightforward and does not depend
on the command C. The proof of Statement 2. is by induction on the proof of the transition
〈C, s〉
τ
−→〈C ′, s′〉. The proof of both statements is given in the Appendix. ✷
Lemma 3.4 (Process transitions are reflected by the translation)
Let 〈C, s〉 be a well-formed configuration and α ∈ ActEnv ∪ {τ}. Then:
1. If [[〈C, s〉]]
α
=⇒P , α 6= τ , then there exist C ′, s′ such that P ≈ [[〈C ′, s′〉]] and
〈C, s〉
α
=⇒〈C ′, s′〉.
2. If [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
=⇒P , then either P ≈ [[〈C, s〉]] or there exist C ′, s′ such that P ≈ [[〈C ′, s′〉]]
and 〈C, s〉
τ
=⇒〈C ′, s′〉.
Proof (Idea) The proof is considerably more elaborate than that of Lemma 3.3. Intuitively,
we need to decompose the computation [[〈C, s〉]]
α
=⇒P or [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
=⇒P into a sequence of
micro-computations, each of which is the simulation of a single (or empty) step of the source
configuration 〈C, s〉, possibly interspersed with relay moves (parallel moves which do not
affect the state and thus can be interleaved with transactions, which are sequences of moves
accessing the state). The proof, as well as the auxiliary definitions and results required for
it, may be found in the Appendix.
✷
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To compare the notion of L-security on PARIMP with that of PBNDC on CCS, it is con-
venient to characterise L-bisimilarity on programs by means of a bisimilarity up to high on
configurations, following [8]. To this end, we introduce restricted configurations of the form
〈C, s〉\R, where 〈C, s〉 is well-formed and R ⊆ Env, whose semantics is specified by the rule:
(Res-Op)
〈C, s〉
α
−→〈C ′, s′〉 subj (α) /∈ R
〈C, s〉\R
α
−→〈C ′, s′〉\R
Let ResConf denote the set of restricted configurations, ranged over by cfg, cfg′, cfgi. For
any cfg = 〈C, s〉\R ∈ ResConf, we let dom(cfg)
def
= dom(s).
We extend our translation to restricted configurations by letting:
[[〈C, s〉\R ]]
def
= [[〈C, s〉]] \R
Let now EnvH
def
= {inX , outX | X ∈ H} and EnvL
def
= {inX , outX | X ∈ L}. We introduce
a transition relation
α
7−→H on ResConf, for any α ∈ ActEnv ∪ {τ}:
cfg
α
7−→H cfg
′ def=
{
cfg
α
−→ cfg′ or cfg = cfg′ if subj (α) ∈ EnvH ∪ {τ}
cfg
α
−→ cfg′ if subj (α) ∈ EnvL
The transition relation
∼
α
7−→H is used to define a notion of (quasi-strong) bisimulation on
restricted configurations, which allows simulation of high or silent actions by inaction:
Definition 3.4 (Bisimulation up-to-high on configurations)
A symmetric relation S ⊆ (ResConf ×ResConf ) is a bisimulation up to high if cfg1 S cfg2
implies dom(cfg1) = dom(cfg2) and, for any α ∈ ActEnv ∪ {τ}:
If cfg1
α
−→ cfg′1 then there exists cfg
′
2 such that cfg2
α
7−→H cfg
′
2 and cfg
′
1 S cfg
′
2.
Two configurations cfg1, cfg2 are bisimilar up to high, written cfg1 ∼H cfg2, if cfg1 S cfg2
for some bisimulation up to high S.
We can immediately establish some simple properties of ∼H :
Property 3.5 Let RH , R
′
H ⊆ EnvH . If 〈C, s〉\RH ∼H 〈D, t〉\R
′
H , then s =L t.
Proof By definition of ∼H , dom(s) = dom(t). Suppose nowX ∈ (dom(s) ∩ L) and s(X) = v.
By Remark 3.2 there is a move 〈C, s〉
outXv−−−−→ 〈C, s〉, from which we deduce, since outX /∈ RH ,
〈C, s〉\RH
outXv−−−−→ 〈C, s〉\RH . Since 〈C, s〉\RH ∼H 〈D, t〉\R
′
H , there must exist a matching
move 〈D, t〉\R′H
outXv−−−−→ 〈D′, t′〉\R′H . Hence t(X) = v by Remark 3.2. ✷
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Property 3.6 For any R ⊆ Env, 〈C, s〉 ∼H 〈D, t〉 implies 〈C, s〉\R ∼H 〈D, t〉\R.
The following simple properties of ∼H will be used to prove Proposition 3.11 below:
Lemma 3.7 For any variable X ∈ L and value V ∈ V al:
〈C, s〉 ∼H 〈D, t〉\EnvH implies 〈C, s [V/X] 〉 ∼H 〈D, t [V/X] 〉\EnvH .
Lemma 3.8 For any variable X ∈ H and values V, V ′ ∈ V al:
〈C, s〉 ∼H 〈D, t〉\EnvH implies 〈C, s [V/X] 〉 ∼H 〈D, t [V
′/X] 〉\EnvH .
Corollary 3.9 For any variable X ∈ H and value V ∈ V al:
〈C, s〉 ∼H 〈D, t〉\EnvH implies 〈C, s [V/X] 〉 ∼H 〈D, t〉\EnvH .
Lemma 3.10 〈C, s〉 ∼H 〈D, t〉\EnvH implies 〈C, s〉\EnvH ∼H 〈D, t〉\EnvH .
We may now establish the relation between low bisimilarity on programs and bisimilarity
up to high on configurations:
Proposition 3.11 (Characterisation of ≃L in terms of ∼H)
Let C,D be PARIMP programs. Then C ≃L D if and only if for any state s such that 〈C, s〉
and 〈D, s〉 are well-formed, we have 〈C, s〉 ∼H 〈D, s〉\EnvH and 〈C, s〉\EnvH ∼H 〈D, s〉.
Proof The proof, independent from the syntax of programs, is given in the Appendix. ✷
Corollary 3.12 (Alternative characterisation of L-security)
Let C be a PARIMP program. Then C is L-secure if and only if 〈C, s〉 ∼H 〈C, s〉\EnvH
for any s such that 〈C, s〉 is well-formed.
We may finally prove the main results of this section:
Theorem 3.13 (Bisimilarity up to high is preserved by the translation)
Let R,R′ ⊆ EnvH . Then 〈C, s〉\R ∼H 〈D, t〉\R
′ implies [[〈C, s〉\R ]] ≈H [[〈D, t〉\R
′ ]], where
H
def
= { getX , putX , inX , outX | X ∈ H } ∪ { lock, unlock, res, done }.
Proof The proof, which consists in exhibiting a weak bisimulation up to high containing
the pair ( [[〈C, s〉\R ]], [[〈D, t〉\R′ ]] ), may be found in the Appendix. ✷
Theorem 3.14 (Security is preserved by the translation) If C is a L-secure program,
then for any state s such that 〈C, s〉 is well-formed, the process [[〈C, s〉]] satisfies PBNDCH,
where H
def
= {getX , putX , inX , outX | X ∈ H} ∪ { lock, unlock, res, done }.
Proof Let s be a state such that 〈C, s〉 is well-formed. Since C is L-secure, by Corollary 3.12
we have 〈C, s〉 ∼H 〈C, s〉\EnvH . Then by Theorem 3.13, [[〈C, s〉 ]] ≈H [[〈C, s〉\EnvH ]].
Since [[〈C, s〉\EnvH ]]
def
= [[〈C, s〉 ]]\EnvH , we conclude that [[〈C, s〉 ]] ∈ PBNDCH. ✷
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As a by-product, we show that the translation preserves the behavioural equivalence which
is obtained from low bisimilarity by assuming all program variables to be low, and therefore
observable. If H = ∅, it is easy to see that L-bisimilarity reduces to the following:
Definition 3.5 (Behavioural equivalence on programs)
A symmetric relation S ⊆ (C × C) is a program bisimulation if C SD implies, for any state
s such that 〈C, s〉 and 〈D, s〉 are well-formed:
If 〈C, s〉 → 〈C ′, s′〉, then there exists D′ such that 〈D, s〉 7→ 〈D′, s′〉 and C ′ S D′.
Two programs C and D are behaviourally equivalent, written C ≃ D, if C S D for some
program bisimulation S.
Similarly, the transitions
α
7−→H and the bisimilarity ∼H on configurations reduce to the
transitions
α
7−→ and the bisimilarity ∼ defined as follows:
cfg
α
7−→ cfg′
def
=
{
cfg
α
−→ cfg′ or cfg = cfg′ if α = τ
cfg
α
−→ cfg′ otherwise
Definition 3.6 (Bisimulation on configurations)
A symmetric relation S on configurations is a bisimulation if 〈C, s〉 S 〈D, t〉 implies s = t
and, for any α ∈ ActEnv ∪ {τ}:
If 〈C, s〉
α
−→〈C ′, s′〉 then there exists D′ such that 〈D, t〉
α
7−→ 〈D′, t′〉 and 〈C ′, s′〉 S 〈D′, t′〉.
Then 〈C, s〉 and 〈D, t〉 are bisimilar, written 〈C, s〉 ∼ 〈D, t〉, if 〈C, s〉 S 〈D, t〉 for some
bisimulation S.
Proposition 3.15 (Characterisation of ≃ in terms of ∼)
Let C,D be programs. Then C ≃ D if and only if for any state s such that 〈C, s〉 and 〈D, s〉
are well-formed, we have 〈C, s〉 ∼ 〈D, s〉.
Theorem 3.16 (Behavioural equivalence is preserved by the translation)
If C ≃ D, then for any state s such that 〈C, s〉 is well-formed, [[〈C, s〉]] ≈ [[〈D, s〉]].
Proof The statement is simply obtained from that of Theorem 3.13 by noticing that, if
H = ∅, then R = R′ = EnvH = ∅, ∼H = ∼ and H = { lock, unlock, res, done }. Then,
since all actions of H are restricted in [[〈C, s〉]] and [[〈D, s〉]], we have [[〈C, s〉]] ≈H [[〈D, s〉]] if
and only if [[〈C, s〉]] ≈ [[〈D, s〉]]. ✷
Note that the equivalence ≃ is rather intensional. For instance it does not in equate the
two programs nil;P and P , unless P does not change the memory. On the other hand we
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have P ; nil ≃ P , as well as (nil ‖ P ) ≃ P . Indeed, as soon as two programs stop modifyng
the memory, they are identified by ≃. This is not surprising since ≃ is derived from ≃L,
which was precisely designed to capture this property as regards the low memory. However,
we may wish to slightly relax ≃ so as to obtain a more natural behavioural equivalence ∼=
on PARIMP, such that nil;P ∼= P holds in general. This can be obtained as follows.
Let 〈C, s〉 ❀ 〈C ′, s′〉 denote the administrative transition relation obtained using the
subset of rules (Seq-Op2), (ParL-Op1), (ParL-Op2), (ParR-Op1) and (ParR-Op2) of
Figure 3, and 〈C, s〉 →c 〈C
′, s′〉 be the computing transition relation obtained without using
rules (Seq-Op2), (ParL-Op2) and (ParR-Op2). We may then define an equivalence ∼=
which always identifies programs whose behaviours differ only for administrative moves.
Definition 3.7 (nil-insensitive behavioural equivalence on programs)
A symmetric relation S ⊆ (C×C) is a nil-insensitive program bisimulation if C SD implies,
for any state s such that 〈C, s〉 and 〈D, s〉 are well-formed:
If 〈C, s〉❀ 〈C ′, s′〉, then there exists D′ such that 〈D, s〉❀∗ 〈D′, s′〉 and C ′ S D′
If 〈C, s〉 →c 〈C
′, s′〉, then there exists D′ such that 〈D, s〉❀∗ 7→ ❀∗ 〈D′, s′〉 and C ′ S D′
The nil-insensitive behavioural equivalence ∼= is then defined by: C ∼= D if C S D for
some nil-insensitive program bisimulation S.
The definitions of L-bisimulation and L-security may be weakened in a similar way. We
conjecture that all the results proved in this section would easily extend to the nil-insensitive
versions of L-security and behavioural equivalence.
Finally, we may wonder whether the arrow 7→ could be replaced by the arrow →∗ in
the definition of L-bisimulation and behavioural equivalence, while preserving our results.
An advantage of this choice would be to open the possibility for a full abstraction result
(restricted to the processes obtained as images of programs), since the resulting security and
equivalence notions, allowing one execution step to be simulated by several steps, would be
closer than ours to weak bisimulation.
Indeed, it is easy to see that our translation is not fully abstract with respect to any of
our security properties, whether nil-sensitive or nil-insensitive. For instance the process
of Example 3.1 is not secure nor nil-insensitive secure, while its encoding into CCS is
secure. For the nil-sensitive security property, another reason of failure for full abstraction
is illustrated by the program:
C = (if XH = 0 then YL := 0 else nil ; YL := 0)
Here [[C]] is secure while C is not secure (on the other hand it is nil-insensitive secure).
At this point of discussion, it may seem surprising that a full abstraction result could
be obtained in [8] for a time-sensitive security notion, which is stronger than our security
properties and thus further away from weak bisimulation. In fact, as mentioned earlier, this
full abstraction result was obtained by using special tick actions in the translation, whose
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function was precisely to enforce a correspondence between steps in the source program and
their encodings in the target process. Indeed, it is easy to see that full abstraction would fail
for time-sensitive security in the absence of such tick actions. For consider the program:
C ′ = (if XH = 0 then loop else nil)
Both C ′ and the program C above are insecure with respect to the time-sensitive security
property of [8]. On the other hand, it is easy to see that the encodings of these programs
without tick actions (i.e. according to the translation of Figure 4), are secure.
The question of whether our results could be extended to the security property of
Sabelfeld and Sands [27], and whether a “natural” full abstraction result could be obtained
in that case, is left for further investigation.
3.5 The translation does not preserve security types
In this section, we show that the type system for CCS presented in Section 2 is not reflected
by our translation. We then sketch a solution to overcome this problem.
Consider the following program, which is typable in the type systems of [30, 27, 29, 4]:
C = XH := XH + 1 ; YL := YL + 1
This program is translated to the following process:
[[C]] = (νd) ( lock. (ν res1) (getXH (x). res1〈x+ 1〉 | res1(z1). putXH 〈z1〉. unlock. d) |
d. lock. (ν res2) (getYL(y). res2〈y + 1〉 | res2(z2). putYL〈z2〉. unlock. done) )
Now, it is easy to see that [[C]] is not typable in the security type system of Section 2.
Indeed, there is no assignment of security levels for the channels lock, unlock and d which
allows [[C]] to be typed. First of all, note that channels lock and unlock must have the same
security level since each of them follows the other in the semaphore (and in the registers).
Consider now the two main parallel components of [[C]], simulating the two assignments:
for the first component to be typable, unlock and d should be high (and thus lock should
be high too); for the second component to be typable, d and lock should be low (and
thus unlock should be low too). In other words, the two components impose conflicting
constraints on the security levels of channels lock, unlock and d.
A possible solution to this problem is to relax the type system by treating more liberally
channels like lock, unlock and d (and hence done, from which d is obtained by renaming),
which carry no values and are restricted. The idea, borrowed from [16, 14, 15, 33, 17], is that
actions on these channels are data flow irrelevant insofar as they are guaranteed to occur,
since in this case their occurrence does not bring any information. The typing rule (Sum)
may then be made less restrictive for these actions, while keeping their security level to h.
It can be observed that replacing rule (Sum) by the rule (Sum-Lax) discussed at page 11
would not solve the problem.
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Note that action lock is eventually enabled from any state of [[〈C, s〉]], since the semaphore
and the pool of registers cyclically come back to their initial state. The situation is not
as simple as concerns the channel done, or more precisely one of its renamings d, as the
occurrence of the (unique) complementary action d could be prevented by divergence or
deadlock. Notice however that deadlock cannot arise in a process [[〈C, s〉]], because the
source configuration 〈C, s〉 can only contain livelocks, due to busy waiting and thus to while
loops. Then, by imposing restrictions on the use of loops and conditionals in programs (as
proposed e.g. in [30, 27, 29, 4]), one may either enforce the occurrence of d in their images,
or make sure that if this occurrence is uncertain because of some high test, then no low
memory change can depend on it.
In conclusion, provided the set of source programs is appropriately restricted by typing,
the lock channels and the relay channels obtained by renaming channel done can be safely
assumed to be high. The formalisation of a type system along these lines, as well as the
study of a more general security type system for state-oriented noninterference on CCS, is
the subject of current work.
4 Conclusion and related work
We addressed the question of relating language-based and process-based security, by fo-
cussing on a simple parallel imperative language a` la Volpano and Smith [30] and on Milner’s
calculus CCS [18]. We presented an encoding from the former to the latter, essentially a
variant of Milner’s well-known translation, and showed that it preserves a time-insensitive
security property. In doing so, we extended previous work by Focardi, Rossi and Sabelfeld [8]
in several respects: (1) we considered a parallel rather than a sequential language, (2) we
studied a time-insensitive rather than a time-sensitive security property, (3) we examined
two variants of Milner’s translation, which are both simpler than that used in [8], and (4)
we proposed a security type system for PBNDC on CCS which, although failing to reflect a
type system for the source language, appears to be a good step towards that purpose.
As concerns related work, besides the paper [25] by Mantel and Sabelfeld, who were
the first to establish security-preserving translations between programming languages and
specification formalisms, we should mention the thorough comparison of language-based
and process-based security carried out in [14] by Honda and Yoshida, who proposed type-
preserving embeddings of powerful languages, both imperative and functional, into a vari-
ant of the asynchronous π-calculus. Closely related to [14] is Kobayashi’s security type
system [17], which is equipped with a type inference algorithm. In both cases, the process
calculus is more expressive than CCS and the type system is rather complex, as it is meant
to grant both a security property and other correctness properties. As regards the expres-
siveness of the considered languages, our work is clearly less ambitious than [14]. However,
an advantage of focussing on a first-order process calculus which does not require any clas-
sical typing, is that the typing requirements for security may be clearly isolated. Moreover,
some issues related to atomicity and to the impact of the sum operator on security, arise in
CCS but not in the asynchronous π-calculus.
RR n➦ 6322
32 I. Castellani
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Maria-Grazia Vigliotti for her contribution at an early stage of this
work, and Fre´de´ric Boussinot for useful comments.
References
[1] Johan Agat. Transforming out timing leaks. Proceedings of POPL ’00, ACM Press,
pages 40–53, 2000.
[2] A. Almeida Matos, G. Boudol and I. Castellani. Typing noninterference for reactive
programs. Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 72: 124-156, 2007.
[3] G. Barthe and L. Prensa Nieto. Formally verifying information flow type systems for
concurrent and thread systems. In Proceedings of FMSE’04, 2004.
[4] G. Boudol and I. Castellani. Noninterference for Concurrent Programs and Thread
Systems. Theoretical Computer Science 281(1): 109-130, 2002.
[5] A. Bossi, R. Focardi, C. Piazza and S. Rossi. Verifying persistent security properties.
Computer Languages, Systems and Structures 30(3-4): 231-258, 2004.
[6] R. Focardi and S. Rossi. Information flow security in dynamic contexts. In Proceedings
of the 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2002.
[7] R. Focardi and R. Gorrieri. Classification of Security Properties (Part I: Information
Flow). In Foundations of Security Analysis and Design - Tutorial Lectures (R. Focardi
and R. Gorrieri, Eds.), volume 2171 of LNCS, Springer, 2001.
[8] R. Focardi, S. Rossi and A. Sabelfeld. Bridging Language-Based and Process Calculi
Security. In Proceedings of FoSSaCs’05, volume 3441 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag, 2005.
[9] S. Crafa and S. Rossi. A theory of noninterference for the π-calculus. In Proceedings
of Symp. on Trustworthy Global Computing TGC’05, volume 3705 of LNCS, Springer-
Verlag, 2005.
[10] M. Hennessy and J. Riely. Information flow vs resource access in the asynchronous
pi-calculus. ACM TOPLAS 24(5): 566-591, 2002.
[11] M. Hennessy. The security π-calculus and noninterference. Journal of Logic and Alge-
braic Programming 63(1): 3-34, 2004.
[12] S. Arun Kumar and M. Hennessy. An efficiency preorder for processes. Acta Informatica
1(29): 737-760, 1992.
INRIA
State-oriented noninterference for CCS 33
[13] K. Honda, V. Vasconcelos and N. Yoshida. Secure information flow as typed process
behavior. In Proceedings of ESOP’00, volume 1782 of LNCS, pages 180-199, Springer-
Verlag, 2000.
[14] K. Honda and N. Yoshida. A uniform type structure for secure information flow. To
appear in ACM TOPLAS. Extended abstract in Proceedings of POPL’02, pages 81-92,
January, 2002.
[15] N. Yoshida, K. Honda and M. Berger. Linearity and bisimulation. In Proceedings of
FoSSaCs’02, volume 2303 of LNCS, pages 417-433, Springer-Verlag, 2002.
[16] N. Kobayashi, B. Pierce and D. Turner. Linearity and the π-calculus. In Proceedings
of POPL’96, pages 358-371, 1996.
[17] N. Kobayashi. Type-based Information Flow Analysis for the Pi-Calculus. Acta Infor-
matica 42(4-5): 291-347, 2005.
[18] R. Milner. Communication and Concurrency. Prentice-Hall International, 1989.
[19] A. Myers. JFlow: practical mostly-static information flow control. In Proceedings of
POPL’99, pages 228-241, 1999.
[20] A. Myers, L. Zheng, S. Zdancewic, S. Chong and N. Nystrom. Jif: Java information
flow. Software release, http://www.cs.cornell.edu/jif, 2001.
[21] F. Pottier. A Simple View of Type-Secure Information Flow in the π-Calculus. In
Proceedings of the 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 320–
330, 2002.
[22] F. Pottier and V. Simonet. Information flow inference for ML. ACM TOPLAS 25(1):
117-158, 2003.
[23] V. Simonet. The FlowCaml system: documentation and user manual. INRIA Tech. Re-
port n. 0282, 2003.
[24] Process algebra and noninterference. In Proceedings of the 12th IEEE Computer Secu-
rity Foundations Workshop, pages 214–227, 1999.
[25] H. Mantel and A. Sabelfeld. A unifying approach to the security of distributed and
multi-threaded programs. Journal of Computer Security 11(4): 615–676, 2003.
[26] A. Sabelfeld and A. C. Myers, Language-based information-flow security. IEEE Journal
on Selected Areas in Communications 211:5-19, 2003.
[27] A. Sabelfeld and D. Sands. Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-threaded Programs.
In Proceedings of the 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 200-
214, 2000.
RR n➦ 6322
34 I. Castellani
[28] D. Sangiorgi and D. Walker. The π-calculus: a Theory of Mobile Processes. Cambridge
University Press, 2001.
[29] G. Smith. A new type system for secure information flow. In Proceedings of the 14th
IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 115–125, 2001.
[30] G. Smith and D. Volpano. Secure information flow in a multi-threaded imperative
language. Proceedings of POPL ’98, ACM Press, pages 355–364, 1998.
[31] D. Volpano and G. Smith. Probabilistic Noninterference in a Concurrent Language.
Journal of Computer Security 7(2-3): 231–253, 1999.
[32] D. Volpano, G. Smith and C. Irvine. A Sound Type System for Secure Flow Analysis.
Journal of Computer Security 4(3):167–187, 1996.
[33] S. Zdancewic and A. Myers. Secure information flow via linear continuations. Higher
Order and Symbolic Computation 15(2-3):209-234, 2002.
[34] G. Winskel. The formal semantics of programming languages. MIT Press, Cambridge
MA, 1993.
INRIA
State-oriented noninterference for CCS 35
Appendix
A Proofs of Theorem 2.3, Lemma 2.4 and Lemma 2.9
Theorem 2.3 [Subject reduction]
For any P ∈ Pr, if Γ ⊢σ P and P
α
−→P ′ then Γ ⊢σ P
′.
Proof By induction on the inference of Γ ⊢σ P . The case of (Rec1) need not be considered,
since in this case no transition is deducible for P . The full proof is reported in the Appendix.
(Sum) Here P =
∑
i∈I πi.Pi and Γ ⊢σ P is deduced from the hypothesis: for all i, Γ(πi) = σ
and Γ ⊢σ Pi. Now, P
α
−→P ′ is deduced using either rule (SUM-OP1) or rule (SUM-
OP2). In both cases the transition uses some prefix πi and leads to either P
′ = Pi,
in case πi is an output prefix, or to P
′ = Pi{v/x} for some v ∈ V al, in case πi is an
input prefix a(x). In the first case, since Γ ⊢σ Pi we can immediately conclude. In the
second case, we use Lemma 2.2 to obtain Γ ⊢σ Pi{v/x}.
(Par) Here P = P1 | P2 and Γ ⊢σ P is deduced from Γ ⊢σ P1 and Γ ⊢σ P2. Then the
transition P
α
−→P ′ is inferred using one of the three rules (PAR-OP1), (PAR-OP2)
and (PAR-OP3). The first two cases are symmetric, so let us assume that P
α
−→P ′ is
deduced from P1
α
−→P ′1 and P
′ = P ′1 | P2. Then by induction Γ ⊢σ P
′
1, thus by rule
(Par) also Γ ⊢σ P
′
1 | P2. Suppose now α = τ and P
α
−→P ′ is deduced from P1
β
−→P ′1,
P2
β
−→P ′2 for some β such that subj (β) 6= τ , and P
′ = P ′1 | P
′
2. By induction Γ ⊢σ P
′
1
and Γ ⊢σ P
′
2, and thus by rule (Par) also Γ ⊢σ P
′
1 | P
′
2.
(Res) Here P = (νb)R and Γ ⊢σ P is deduced from Γ, b : θ ⊢σ R. Then P
α
−→P ′ is
deduced using rule (RES-OP) from R
α
−→R′ and b 6= subj (α), and thus P ′ = (νb)R′.
By induction Γ, b : θ ⊢σ R
′. Then by rule (Res) also Γ ⊢σ (νb)R
′.
(Rec2) Here P = (rec A(x˜) . Q)(e˜) and Γ ⊢σ P is deduced from Γ, A : σ ⊢σ Q. Then
P
α
−→P ′ is inferred using rule (REC-OP) from Q{v˜/x˜}{ (rec A(x˜) . Q) /A }
α
−→P ′.
By Lemma 2.2, Γ ⊢σ Q{v˜/x˜}{ (recA(x˜) . Q) /A }. Then by induction Γ ⊢σ P
′.
(Sub) Here Γ ⊢σ P is deduced from Γ ⊢θ P for some θ ≥ σ. By induction, P
α
−→P ′ implies
Γ ⊢θ P
′. Then by rule (Sub) also Γ ⊢σ P
′.
✷
Lemma 2.4 [Confinement]
Let P ∈ Pr and Γ ⊢σ P . If P
α
−→P ′ and α 6= τ then Γ(α) ≥ σ.
Proof By induction on the proof of Γ ⊢σ P . We do not need to consider the case of (Rec1).
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(Sum) Here P =
∑
i∈I πi.Pi and Γ ⊢σ P is deduced from the hypotheses Γ(πi) = σ and
Γ ⊢σ Pi. Now, P
α
−→P ′ is deduced using either rule (SUM-OP1) or rule (SUM-OP2).
In both cases, the transition uses some prefix πi and leads to the corresponding Pi (or
Pi{v/x} for some v ∈ V al, in case πi is an input prefix a(x)). Then Γ(α) = Γ(πi) = σ.
(Par) Here P = P1 | P2 and Γ ⊢σ P is deduced from Γ ⊢σ P1 and Γ ⊢σ P2. Since α 6= τ ,
P
α
−→P ′ is inferred using either rule (PAR-OP1) or rule (PAR-OP2). In both cases
we obtain Γ(α) ≥ σ by induction.
(Res) Here P = (νb)Q and Γ ⊢σ P is deduced from Γ, b : θ ⊢σ Q. Then P
α
−→P ′ is
deduced using rule (RES-OP) from Q
α
−→Q′ and b 6= subj (α). Let Γ′ = Γ ∪ {(b, θ)}.
By induction Γ′(α) ≥ σ. Since Γ(β) = Γ′(β) whenever subj (β) 6= b, it follows that
Γ(α) = Γ′(α) ≥ σ.
(Rec2) Here P = (rec A(x˜) . Q)(e˜) and Γ ⊢σ P is deduced from Γ, A : σ ⊢σ Q. Then
P
α
−→P ′ is inferred using rule (REC-OP) from Q{v˜/x˜}{ (rec A(x˜) . Q) /A }
α
−→P ′.
By Lemma 2.2, Γ ⊢σ Q{v˜/x˜}{ (recA(x˜) . Q) /A }. Then by induction Γ(α) ≥ σ.
(Sub) Here Γ ⊢σ P is deduced from Γ ⊢θ P for some θ ≥ σ. By induction Γ(α) ≥ θ, thus
by transitivity Γ(α) ≥ σ.
✷
Lemma 2.9 [≈H – invariance under high actions]
Let P ∈ Pr, Γ ⊢σ P and H = { a ∈ N : Γ(a) = h }. If P
α
−→P ′ and Γ(α) = h then
P ≈H P
′.
Proof Let S be the binary relation on Pr defined inductively as follows: (P,Q) ∈ S if and
only if there exist Γ and σ such that Γ ⊢σ P , Γ ⊢σ Q and, letting H = { a ∈ N : Γ(a) = h },
one of the following holds:
1. P ≈H Q
2. P,Q ∈ PrH
sem
3. P
α
−→Q or Q
α
−→P for some α such that Γ(α) = h
4. P = P1 | P2, Q = Q1 | Q2 and (Pi, Qi) ∈ S for i = 1, 2
5. There exists R such that Γ ⊢σ R, (P,R) ∈ S and (R,Q) ∈ S
6. P = (νb)R, Q = (νb)S and there exists θ such that Γ∪{(b, θ)} ⊢σ R, Γ∪{(b, θ)} ⊢σ S,
and (R,S) ∈ S
7. P = (recA(x˜) . R)(e˜) and (R{v˜/x˜}{ (recA(x˜) . R) /A }, Q) ∈ S, with v˜ = val(e˜)
We show that S is a weak bisimulation up to high, by induction on the definition of S.
We have to show that for any pair (P,Q) ∈ S, processes P and Q can do the same weak
transitions “up to high” (for the given H), leading to derivatives which are related by S.
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1. P ≈H Q. This is the basic case: here the required property holds by definition.
2. P,Q ∈ PrH
sem
. Then P ≈H Q by Lemma 2.7, so we fall again in Case 1.
3. It is enough to treat one of the two symmetric cases. Suppose P
α
−→Q for some α
such that Γ(α) = h. We use a further induction on the inference of Γ ⊢σ P .
(Sum) Here P =
∑
i∈I πi.Pi and Γ ⊢σ P is deduced from the hypothesis: for all i,
Γ(πi) = σ and Γ ⊢σ Pi. Now, P
α
−→Q is deduced using either rule (SUM-OP1)
or rule (SUM-OP2). In both cases, the transition uses some prefix πi and leads
to Q = Pi (or Q = Pi{v/x} for some v ∈ V al, in case πi is an input prefix a(x)).
Then σ = Γ(πi) = Γ(α) = h and we have Γ ⊢h P and Γ ⊢h Q. By Lemma 2.6 it
follows that P,Q ∈ PrΓ
sem
, and thus, by Fact 2.5, P,Q ∈ PrH
sem
. Then we fall back
into Case 2.
(Par) Here P = P1 | P2 and Γ ⊢σ P is deduced from Γ ⊢σ P1 and Γ ⊢σ P2. Since
α 6= τ , the transition P
α
−→Q is inferred using either rule (PAR-OP1) or rule
(PAR-OP2). The two cases are symmetric, so let us assume that P
α
−→Q is
deduced from P1
α
−→P ′1 and Q = P
′
1 | P2. We want to relate the two processes
P = P1 | P2 and Q = P
′
1 | P2. By induction (P1, P
′
1) ∈ S. Since P2 ≈H P2, we
have (P2, P2) ∈ S by Clause 1, and thus (P,Q) = (P1 | P2, P
′
1 | P2) ∈ S by
Clause 4.
(Res) Here P = (νb)R and Γ ⊢σ P is deduced from Γ, b : θ ⊢σ R. Then P
α
−→Q
is deduced using rule (RES-OP) from R
α
−→R′ and b 6= subj (α), and thus Q =
(νb)R′. By induction (R,R′) ∈ S. Let Γ′ = Γ ∪ {(b, θ)}. Since Γ′ ⊢σ R, by
subject reduction Γ′ ⊢σ R
′. Then (P,Q) = ( (νb)R, (νb)R′ ) ∈ S by Clause 6.
(Rec2) Here P = (rec A(x˜) . R)(e˜) and Γ ⊢σ P is deduced from the hypothesis
Γ, A : σ ⊢σ R. Then P
α
−→Q is inferred using rule (REC-OP) from S =
R{v˜/x˜}{ (rec A(x˜) . R) /A }
α
−→Q. By Lemma 2.2 we know that Γ ⊢σ S, thus
by induction (S, Q) ∈ S and therefore (P,Q) ∈ S by Clause 7.
(Sub) Here Γ ⊢σ P is deduced from Γ ⊢θ P for some θ ≥ σ. Since P
α
−→Q, by subject
reduction it follows that Γ ⊢θ Q. Then (P,Q) ∈ S by induction.
4. Here P = P1 | P2, Q = Q1 | Q2 and (Pi, Qi) ∈ S for i = 1, 2. It is enough to
examine the case where P moves first, since the other one is symmetric. So suppose
P
β
−→P ′. There are two cases to consider, according to whether the move comes from
one component (in which case it is deduced using rule (PAR-OP1) or (PAR-OP2)), or
from both components (in which case it is deduced using (PAR-OP3)).
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(PAR-OP1) In this case P
β
−→P ′ is deduced from P1
β
−→P ′1, and P
′ = P ′1 | P2. Since
(P1, Q1) ∈ S, by induction there exists Q
′
1 such that Q1
∼
β
=⇒HQ
′
1 and (P
′
1, Q
′
1) ∈
S. Then Q can reply by the transition Q = Q1 | Q2
∼
β
=⇒HQ
′
1 | Q2 = Q
′, where
(P ′1 | P2, Q
′
1 | Q2) ∈ S by Clause 4 again.
(PAR-OP3) Here P
τ
−→P ′ because for some a, v, P1
av
−→P ′1, P2
a¯v
−→P ′2 (or conversely)
and P ′ = P ′1 | P
′
2. There are two possible cases:
❼ If Γ(a) = h, we have (P ′i , Pi) ∈ S by Clause 3. By hypothesis (Pi, Qi) ∈ S.
Hence (P ′i , Qi) ∈ S by Clause 5. Therefore Q can reply to the move P =
P1 | P2
τ
−→P ′1 | P
′
2 = P
′ by the empty move Q = Q1 | Q2
τ
−→
∗
Q1 | Q2 = Q
′,
where (P ′, Q′) = (P ′1 | P
′
2, Q1 | Q2) ∈ S by Clause 4 again.
❼ If Γ(a) 6= h, then by induction Q1
∼
av
=⇒HQ
′
1 and Q2
∼
a¯v
=⇒HQ
′
2, with (P
′
i , Q
′
i) ∈
S. Since the actions av and a¯v are not high, these transitions coincide with
Q1
cav
=⇒Q′1 andQ2
c¯av
=⇒Q′2, and since av and a¯v are visible actions, they further
coincide with Q1
av
=⇒Q′1 and Q2
a¯v
=⇒Q′2. This means that there exist Q̂i
and Q̂′i such that Q1
τ
−→
∗
Q̂1
av
−→ Q̂′1
τ
−→
∗
Q′1 and Q2
τ
−→
∗
Q̂2
a¯v
−→ Q̂′2
τ
−→
∗
Q′2.
Then Q can reply to the move P = P1 | P2
τ
−→P ′1 | P
′
2 = P
′ by the sequence
of τ -moves Q = Q1 | Q2
τ
−→
∗
Q̂1 | Q̂2
τ
−→ Q̂′1 | Q̂
′
2
τ
−→
∗
Q′1 | Q
′
2 = Q
′, where
(P ′, Q′) = (P ′1 | P
′
2, Q
′
1 | Q
′
2) ∈ S by Clause 4 again.
5. Here there exists R such that Γ ⊢σ R, (P,R) ∈ S and (R,Q) ∈ S. Let P
β
−→P ′.
If Γ(β) 6= h, then by induction R
bβ
=⇒R′, with (P ′, R′) ∈ S, and correspondingly
Q
bβ
=⇒Q′, with (R′, Q′) ∈ S. Then (P,Q) ∈ S by Clause 5 again. If Γ(β) = h, then
(P ′, P ) ∈ S by Clause 3, and hence (P ′, R) ∈ S by Clause 5, whence (P ′, Q) ∈ S, by
Clause 5 again. This means that Q can reply to P
β
−→P ′ by the empty move Q
τ
−→
∗
Q.
6. Here we have P = (νb)R and Q = (νb)S, (R,S) ∈ S, and there exists θ such that
Γ∪{(b, θ)} ⊢σ R and Γ∪{(b, θ)} ⊢σ S. In this case a move P = (νb)R
β
−→ (νb)R′ = P ′
is deduced by rule (RES-OP) from R
β
−→R′ and b 6= subj (β). By induction S
∼
β
=⇒H S
′,
with (R′, S′) ∈ S. By subject reduction we have Γ∪{(b, θ)} ⊢σ R
′ and Γ∪{(b, θ)} ⊢σ S
′.
Then Q = (νb)S
∼
β
=⇒H (νb)S
′, where ((νb)R′, (νb)S′) ∈ S by Clause 6 again.
7. Here P = (recA(x˜) . R)(e˜) , (R{val(e˜)/x˜}{ (recA(x˜) . R) /A }, Q) ∈ S, and P
β
−→P ′
is inferred by (REC-OP) from R{val(e˜)/x˜}{ (recA(x˜) . R) /A }
β
−→P ′. By induction
Q
∼
β
=⇒HQ
′, with (P ′, Q′) ∈ S. Hence Q
∼
β
=⇒HQ
′ is the required matching move. ✷
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B Semantics and typing of renaming and conditional
The operational rule for the CCS renaming operator f [P ], where f is a finite function from
N to N , extended to actions by letting f(av) = f(a)v, f(av) = f(a)v and f(τ) = τ , is:
(REN-OP)
P
α
−→P ′
f [P ]
f(α)
−→ f [P ′]
The typing rule for renaming is (remembering that f is assumed to preserve the security
level of channels):
(Ren)
Γ ⊢σ P
Γ ⊢σ f [P ]
The operational rules for the CCS conditional operator are:
(COND-OP1)
val(e) = tt
(if e then P else Q)
τ
−→P
(COND-OP2)
val(e) = ff
(if e then P else Q)
τ
−→Q
Alternatively, we could have adopted the following rules, as in [18]:
(COND-OP′1)
val(e) = tt , P
α
−→P ′
(if e then P else Q)
α
−→P ′
(COND-OP′2)
val(e) = ff , Q
α
−→Q′
(if e then P else Q)
α
−→Q′
We choose to use rules (COND-OP1) and (COND-OP2) instead, since they allow for a more
precise operational correspondence between PARIMP programs and their CCS images.
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The typing rule for conditionals is:
(Cond)
Γ ⊢σ P Γ ⊢σ Q
Γ ⊢σ (if e then P else Q)
Rule (Cond) may look excessively simple, as it disregards the tested expression. However,
since the type system does not allow a high action to be prefixed to a process containing
low actions, this rule will be sufficient to exclude an insecure process like:
aH(x). (if x = 0 then bℓ〈0〉 else bℓ〈1〉)
as well as the process P discussed in the Introduction, which contains an indirect flow.
C Preliminary results about the translation
We recall here some definitions and results from [18].
Definition C.1 (Well-termination)
A process P is well-terminating if for every derivative P ′ of P :
1. It is not possible that P ′
done
−→
2. If P ′
done
−→ then P ′ ≈ done.0
The following results from [18] also hold for our translation.
Proposition C.1 (Well-termination is preserved by transitions and by ≈)
1. If P is well-terminating and P
α
−→P ′, then P ′ is well-terminating
2. If P is well-terminating and P ≈ Q, then Q is well-terminating
Proposition C.2 (The image of a program is well-terminating)
If C is a PARIMP program, then its CCS image [[C]] is well-terminating.
Proposition C.3 (Simple properties of Before and Par)
For every process P , the following properties hold:
1. Done Before P ≈ P
2. Done Par P ≈ P
Moreover, if P is well-terminating then:
3. P Before Done ≈ P
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D Proofs of Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4.
We start by introducing some notation. Given an observable pool of registers [[s]], where
dom(s) = {X1, . . . , Xn}, the possible states of each register ORegXi , as defined at page 3.4:
ORegXi(v)
def
= putXi(x). ORegXi(x) + getXi〈v〉. ORegXi(v) +
lock. ( inXi(x). unlock. ORegXi(x) + unlock. ORegXi(v) ) +
lock. ( outXi〈v〉. unlock. ORegXi(v) + unlock. ORegXi(v) )
will be denoted by:
1. ORegXi(v) (the register associated with Xi, containing value v)
2. OReginXi(v)
def
= inXi(x). unlock. ORegXi(x) + unlock. ORegXi(v)
3. OReglockXi (v)
def
= unlock. ORegXi(v)
4. ORegoutXi (v)
def
= outXi〈v〉. unlock. ORegXi(v) + unlock. ORegXi(v)
Correspondingly, the states of the pool of observable registers will be denoted by:
1. RP (v˜)
def
= ORegX1(v1) | · · · | ORegXn(vn) = [[s
′]], where dom(s′) = dom(s)
2. RP ini (v˜)
def
= ORegX1(v1) | · · · | OReg
in
Xi
(vi) | · · · | ORegXn(vn)
3. RP locki (v˜)
def
= ORegX1(v1) | · · · | OReg
lock
Xi
(vi) | · · · | ORegXn(vn)
4. RP outi (v˜)
def
= ORegX1(v1) | · · · | OReg
out
Xi
(vi) | · · · | ORegXn(vn)
Let RP-state range over {RP (v˜), RP ini (v˜), RP
lock
i (v˜), RP
out
i (v˜), RP
out′
i (v˜) | v˜ = 〈v1, . . . , vn〉, vi ∈
V al}. Let also Sem′ = unlock.Sem, and Sem-state range over {Sem, Sem′}.
Definition D.1 (Image-derivatives and abstract states)
A process P is an image-derivative if there exists a well-formed configuration 〈C, s〉 such
that [[〈C, s〉]]
τˆ
=⇒P . If [[〈C, s〉]] = ( [[C]] | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
τˆ
=⇒P , then P has the form:
P = (W | RP-state | Sem-state ) ↾ Env
for some register pool state RP-state, semaphore state Sem-state and derivative W of [[C]].
The component (RP-state | Sem-state ) is the abstract state of the image-derivative P .
Definition D.2 An image-derivative P = (W | RP-state | Sem-state ) ↾ Env is said to be
unlocked if Sem-state = Sem, and locked if Sem-state = Sem′.
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Definition D.3 Let ≡ be the structural congruence on CCS which allows for the rearrange-
ment of parallel components, the elimination of 0 parallel components and the localisation
of restriction and renaming on the components they affect. Clearly, ≡ preserves strong
transitions and is stronger than ≈.
Lemma 3.3 [Program transitions are preserved by the translation]
Let 〈C, s〉 be a well-formed configuration. Then:
1. If 〈C, s〉
α
−→〈C ′, s′〉, α 6= τ , then there exists P such that [[〈C, s〉]]
α
=⇒P = [[〈C ′, s′〉]].
2. If 〈C, s〉
τ
−→〈C ′, s′〉, there exist P,C ′′ such that [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
=⇒P ≡ [[〈C ′′, s′〉]] ≈ [[〈C ′, s′〉]].
Proof The proof of Statement 1. does not depend on the command C. Suppose that
dom(s) = {X1, . . . , Xn} and s(Xi) = vi. Let v˜ = 〈v1, . . . , vn〉. There are two possible cases:
❼ If 〈C, s〉
inXiv−−−→ 〈C, s[v/Xi]〉 for some v,Xi, then [[〈C, s〉]] = ( [[C]] | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
can reply with the sequence of moves, where v˜′ = 〈v1, . . . , v︸︷︷︸
i
, . . . , vn〉:
( [[C]] | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env = ( [[C]] | RP (v˜) | Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
−→ ( [[C]] | RP ini (v˜) | Sem
′ ) ↾ Env
inXiv−−−→ ( [[C]] | RP locki (v˜
′) | Sem′ ) ↾ Env
τ
−→ ( [[C]] | RP (v˜′) | Sem ) ↾ Env
= [[〈C, s[v/Xi]〉]]
❼ If 〈C, s〉
outXivi−−−−−→ 〈C, s〉 for some Xi, then we have similarly (and more simply):
( [[C]] | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env = ( [[C]] | RP (v˜) | Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
−→ ( [[C]] | RP outi (v˜) | Sem
′ ) ↾ Env
outXiv−−−−→ ( [[C]] | RP locki (v˜) | Sem
′ ) ↾ Env
τ
−→ ( [[C]] | RP (v˜) | Sem ) ↾ Env
= [[〈C, s〉]]
This ends the proof of Statement 1.
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We prove now Statement 2. by induction on the proof of the transition 〈C, s〉 → 〈C ′, s′〉.
1. (Assign-Op) In this case the transition is of the form 〈X := E, s〉 → 〈nil, s[s(E)/X]〉.
Correspondingly we have:
[[〈X := E, s〉]] = ( lock. [[E]] Into (x) (putX〈x〉. unlock.Done) | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
−→ ( [[E]] Into (x) (putX〈x〉. unlock.Done) | [[s]] | unlock.Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
=⇒ (0 | (putX〈s(E)〉. unlock.Done) | [[s]] | unlock.Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
−→ (0 | (unlock.Done) | [[s[s(E)/X] ]] | unlock.Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
−→ (0 | Done | [[s[s(E)/X] ]] | Sem ) ↾ Env = P
≡ (Done | [[s[s(E)/X] ]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= [[〈nil, s[s(E)/X]〉]]
2. (Seq-Op1) Here C = C1;C2 and the transition 〈C1;C2, s〉 → 〈C
′
1;C2, s
′〉 is deduced
from 〈C1, s〉 → 〈C
′
1, s
′〉. By induction there exist P1, C
′′
1 such that [[〈C1, s〉]]
τ
=⇒P1 ≡
[[〈C ′′1 , s
′〉]] ≈ [[〈C ′1, s
′〉]]. Then we can deduce:
[[〈C1;C2, s〉]] = ( ([[C1]]Before [[C2]]) | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= ( ([[C1]][d/done] | d. [[C2]])\d | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
=⇒ ( (P1[d/done] | d. [[C2]])\d ) ↾ Env = P
≡ ( ([[C ′′1 ]][d/done] | d. [[C2]])\d | [[s
′]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
≈ ( ([[C ′1]][d/done] | d. [[C2]])\d | [[s
′]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= ( ([[C ′1]]Before [[C2]]) | [[s
′]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= [[〈C ′1;C2, s
′〉]]
3. (Seq-Op2) In this case C = nil;C2 and 〈nil;C2, s〉 → 〈C2, s〉. Correspondingly:
[[〈nil;C2, s〉]] = ( ([[nil]]Before [[C2]]) | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= ( (Done [d/done] | d. [[C2]])\d | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
−→ (0 [d/done] | [[C2]])\d | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env = P
≡ ( [[C2]]) | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= [[〈C2, s〉]]
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4. (Cond-Op1) Here C = (if E then C1 else C2) and 〈if E then C1 else C2, s〉 →
〈C1, s〉 is deduced from s(E) = tt. Then we have:
[[〈if E then C1 else C2, s〉]] = ( lock. [[E]] Into (x) (if x then unlock. [[C1]] else unlock. [[C2]]) |
[[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
=⇒ ( res〈tt〉.0 | res(x). (if x then unlock. [[C1]] else unlock. [[C2]]) |
[[s]] | unlock.Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
−→ ( 0 | (if tt then unlock. [[C1]] else unlock. [[C2]]) |
[[s]] | unlock.Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
−→ (0 | (unlock. [[C1]] | [[s]] | unlock.Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
−→ (0 | [[C1]] | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env = P
≡ ( [[C1]] | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= [[〈C1, s〉]]
5. (While-Op1)Here C = (while E do C1) and 〈while E do C1, s〉 → 〈C1; while E do C1, s〉
is deduced from s(E) = tt. Then we can deduce, as in the previous case:
[[〈while E do C1, s〉]] = (W | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env whereW
def
= lock. [[E]] Into (x)
(if x then unlock. [[C1]] Before W else unlock.Done)
τ
=⇒ (0 | (if tt then unlock. [[C1]] Before W else unlock.Done) |
[[s]] | unlock.Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
=⇒ (0 | [[C1]] Before W | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env = P
≡ ( [[C1]] Before W | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= [[〈C1; while E do C1, s〉]]
6. (While-Op2) Here C = (while E do C1) and 〈while E do C1, s〉 → 〈nil, s〉 is de-
duced from s(E) = ff. In this case we have:
[[〈while E do C1, s〉]]
τ
=⇒ (0 | (if ff then unlock. [[C1]] Before W else unlock.Done) |
[[s]] | unlock.Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
=⇒ (0 | Done | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env = P
≡ (Done | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= [[〈nil, s〉]]
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7. (ParL-Op1) Here C = (C1 ‖ C2) and 〈C1 ‖ C2, s〉 → 〈C
′
1 ‖ C2, s
′〉 is deduced
from 〈C1, s〉 → 〈C
′
1, s
′〉. By induction there exist P1, C
′′
1 such that [[〈C1, s〉]]
τ
=⇒P1 ≡
[[〈C ′′1 , s
′〉]] ≈ [[〈C ′1, s
′〉]]. Then we can deduce:
[[〈C1 ‖ C2 , s〉]] = ( ( [[C1]]Par [[C2]] ) | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= ( ( [[C1]][d1/done] | [[C2]][d2/done] | (d1. d2.Done+ d2. d1.Done) )\{d1, d2} |
[[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
=⇒ (P1[d1/done] | [[C2]][d2/done] | (d1. d2.Done+ d2. d1.Done) )\{d1, d2} ↾ Env = P
≡ ( ( [[C ′′1 ]][d1/done] | [[C2]][d2/done] | (d1. d2.Done+ d2. d1.Done))\{d1, d2} |
[[s′]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
≈ ( ( [[C ′1]][d1/done] | [[C2]][d2/done] | (d1. d2.Done+ d2. d1.Done))\{d1, d2} |
[[s′]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= [[〈C ′1 ‖ C2, s
′〉]]
8. (ParL-Op2) Here C = (nil ‖ C2) and the transition is 〈nil ‖ C2, s〉 → 〈C2, s〉. Then
we have, using Proposition C.3 to replace [[C2]]Before Done by [[C2]] in the last line:
[[〈nil ‖ C2, s〉]] = ( ( [[nil]]Par [[C2]] ) | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= ( (Done [d1/done] | [[C2]] [d2/done] | (d1. d2.Done+ d2. d1.Done) )\{d1, d2} |
[[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
−→ ( (0 [d1/done] | [[C2]] [d2/done] | d2.Done )\{d1, d2} | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env = P
≡ ( ( [[C2]] [d2/done] | d2.Done)\d2 | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= ( ( [[C2]]Before Done ) | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
≈ ( [[C2]] | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env = [[〈C2, s〉]]
✷
Remark D.1
By inspecting the proof, one may observe that, because of Case 8. (use of Proposition C.3),
Statement 2 of Lemma 3.3 cannot be replaced by the stronger property:
〈C, s〉
τ
−→〈C ′, s′〉 implies ∃P. [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
=⇒P ≡ [[〈C ′, s′〉]]
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To prove the next result, which relates the computations of a process [[〈C, s〉]] with those
of its source configuration 〈C, s〉, we need to be able to decompose each computation of
[[〈C, s〉]] into a sequence of subcomputations corresponding, as closely as possible, to the
simulation of a single step of 〈C, s〉. We start by classifying the possible steps performed by
a configuration 〈C, s〉:
Definition D.4 (Administrative and computing steps)
A configuration 〈C, s〉 may perform two kinds of steps:
1. administrative steps, whose effect is to eliminate a nil subterm: these are inferred
using one of the rules (Seq-Op2), (ParL-Op2), (ParR-Op2) of Figure 3;
2. computing steps, which involve an access to the state: these are further divided into
internal accesses, inferred by one of the remaining rules of Figure 3, and external
accesses, derived by one of the rules (In-Op) or (Out-Op) at page 24.
The computations that simulate a configuration’s step, whose description has been given in
the proof of Lemma 3.3, can now be classified correspondingly:
Definition D.5 (Relay moves and transactions)
The steps of a configuration 〈C, s〉 are simulated in [[〈C, s〉]] as follows:
1. an administrative step is simulated by a relay move, defined as a pure synchronisation
between the terminating action of some parallel component and a starting action of
another component.
2. an internal access is simulated by an internal transaction, a minimal sequence of τ -
moves which starts by taking the semaphore and ends by releasing it, accessing the
state in between.
3. an external access is simulated by an external transaction, a minimal sequence of
moves of the form
τ
−→
α
−→
τ
−→ , which starts by taking the semaphore and ends by
releasing it, accessing the state in between by means of action α.
Remark D.2 In a computation of [[〈C, s〉]], two transactions can never be interleaved, since
each of them starts by taking the semaphore and ends by releasing it. On the other hand a
transaction may be interleaved with relay moves from some parallel component. Relay moves
do not act on the abstract state (as defined at page 41). External transactions act only on
the abstract state, and internal transactions act on both [[C]] and the abstract state.
Due to Remark D.2, we cannot simply decompose a computation of [[〈C, s〉]] into a sequence
of transactions and relay moves. We are forced to consider transactions modulo the inclusion
of relay moves. To this end we introduce the notion of micro-computation. Intuitively, a
micro-computation is either a relay move between two unlocked states, or a computation
which lies within the simulation of a single computing step of the source configuration, i.e. a
partial or complete transaction, possibly interspersed with relay moves.
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The notion of micro-computation is formalised by means of a new transition relation P
α
‖=⇒P ′,
where P is assumed to be an unlocked image-derivative.
Definition D.6 (Micro-computations and micro-derivatives)
Let P be an unlocked image-derivative. A complete micro-computation of P is either a move
P
τ
−→P ′, where P ′ is unlocked, or, for some α ∈ ActEnv ∪ {τ}, a computation of the form:
P = P0
τ
−→P1 · · · Pk
α
−→Pk+1 · · · Pn−1
τ
−→Pn = P
′
where n > 2, 0 < k < n− 1, processes P1, . . . , Pn−1 are locked and process Pn is unlocked.
A micro-computation is a non empty prefix of a complete micro-computation.
A micro-computation can be specified directly by means of the transition relation P
α
‖=⇒P ′,
defined on image-derivatives as follows. For any α ∈ ActEnv ∪ {τ} and image-derivative P :
P
α
‖=⇒P ′ ⇔def (α = τ ∧ P
α
−→P ′ ∧ P, P ′ unlocked )
or (α ∈ ActEnv ∪ {τ} ∧ ∃n > 1 . ∃ k . 0 ≤ k < n .∃P0, . . . , Pn .
P = P0
τ
−→P1 · · · Pk
α
−→Pk+1 · · · Pn−1
τ
−→Pn = P
′
P0 unlocked ∧ P1, . . . , Pn−1 locked )
If P
α
‖=⇒P ′ then P ′ is said to be a micro-derivative of P .
By definition P
α
‖=⇒P ′ if and only if the underlying computation is a micro-computation.
In a micro-computation, only the initial and possibly the final state are unlocked. Thus
a micro-computation covers at most one semaphore cycle. A micro-computation is said to
be locking if it goes through at least one locked state, unlocking otherwise. Note that an
unlocking micro-computation is always a relay move. The converse is not true since relay
moves can also occur between two locked states. However, if P = [[〈C, s〉]] then P
τ
−→P ′ is
a relay move if and only if it is unlocking, that is, if and only if P ′ is unlocked.
To prove the next results, we will need to introduce a new relation <∼ on processes, which
we call relay expansion preorder, and which is inspired both by the expansion preorder of [28]
and by the efficiency preorder of [12]. The intuition for P <∼Q is that Q strongly simulates
P 7, while P simulates the relay moves of Q either by a relay move or by inaction, and
strongly simulates the remaining transitions of Q. This is clearly an asymmetric relation,
lying between strong and weak bisimulation, and refining that of [28]. In the next definition
and whenever necessary, we shall distinguish relay moves by using the notation
τ
−→ r. The
set of relay moves will be denoted by Relay
def
= {P
τ
−→ rP
′ | P, P ′ ∈ Pr}.
7According to the classical notion of strong simulation, see [18].
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Definition D.7 (Relay expansion preorder) A relation S ⊆ (Pr×Pr) is a relay expan-
sion relation if P S Q implies, for any α ∈ Act:
(i) If P
α
−→P ′ then there exists Q′ such that Q
α
−→Q′ and P ′ S Q′.
(ii) If Q
α
−→Q′ and Q
α
−→Q′ /∈ Relay, then there exists P ′ such that P
α
−→P ′ and P ′ S Q′.
(iii) If Q
τ
−→ r Q
′ then either P S Q′ or there exists P ′ such that P
τ
−→ r P
′ and P ′ S Q′.
We set P <∼ Q if P S Q for some relay expansion relation S. The relation <∼ is called the
relay expansion preorder. We shall also use Q>∼ P to stand for P <∼Q.
We show now that every relay move of the image [[〈C, s〉]] of a configuration is, up to >∼,
reflected by an administrative step of 〈C, s〉.
Lemma D.3 (Relay moves are reflected by administrative steps)
Let 〈C, s〉 be a well-formed configuration. If [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
−→P is a relay move, then ∃C ′, C ′′
such that 〈C, s〉
τ
−→〈C ′, s〉 and P ≡ [[〈C ′′, s〉]]>∼ [[〈C
′, s〉]].
Proof By induction on the structure of C. There are only two cases to consider, namely
sequential and parallel composition.
1. C = C1;C2. We distinguish two cases:
i) If C1 = nil, the unique relay move [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
−→P is:
[[〈nil;C2, s〉]] = ( ([[nil]]Before [[C2]]) | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= ( (Done [d/done] | d. [[C2]])\d | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
−→ ( (0 [d/done] | [[C2]])\d | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env = P
≡ ( [[C2]] | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= [[〈C2, s〉]]
Here P ≡ [[〈C2, s〉]]. Since 〈nil;C2, s〉
τ
−→〈C2, s〉, we may conclude.
ii) If C1 6= nil, then any relay move [[〈C1;C2, s〉]]
τ
−→P is of the form:
[[〈C1;C2, s〉]] = ( ([[C1]]Before [[C2]]) | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= ( ([[C1]][d/done] | d. [[C2]])\d | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
−→ (P1[d/done] | d. [[C2]])\d ↾ Env
for some P1 such that [[〈C1, s〉]]
τ
−→P1.
By induction there exist C ′1, C
′′
1 such that 〈C1, s〉
τ
−→〈C ′1, s〉 and P1 ≡ [[〈C
′′
1 , s〉]]>∼
[[〈C ′1, s〉]]. From P1 ≡ [[〈C
′′
1 , s〉]] = ( [[C
′′
1 ]] | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env we may now deduce
((P1[d/done] | d. [[C2]])\d) ↾ Env ≡ ((C
′′
1 [d/done] | d. [[C2]])\d | [[s]] | Sem) ↾ Env
>∼ ((C
′
1[d/done] | d. [[C2]])\d | [[s]] | Sem) ↾ Env = [[〈C
′
1;C2, s〉]]. We may then
conclude, since 〈C1;C2, s〉
τ
−→〈C ′1;C2, s〉.
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2. C = (C1 ‖ C2). Note that the [[Ci]]’s cannot communicate with each other, since they
have no complementary actions. Then the relay move [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
−→P involves only one
of the [[Ci]]’s, say [[C1]]. Again, there are two cases to consider:
i) C1 = nil. In this case we have:
[[〈nil ‖ C2 , s〉]] = ( ( [[nil]]Par [[C2]] ) | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= ( (Done [d1/done] | [[C2]][d2/done] | (d1. d2.Done+ d2. d1.Done) ) \{d1, d2} |
[[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
−→ ( (0 [d1/done] | [[C2]][d2/done] | d2.Done) \{d1, d2} | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env = P
≡ ( ([[C2]][d2/done] | d2.Done) \d2 | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= ( ([[C2]] Before Done) | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
>∼ ( [[C2]] | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
Since 〈nil ‖ C2, s〉
τ
−→〈C2, s〉, we may conclude.
ii) C1 6= nil. Then the relay move [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
−→P is of the form:
[[〈C1 ‖ C2 , s〉]] = ( ( [[C1]]Par [[C2]] ) | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= ( ([[C1]][d1/done] | [[C2]][d2/done] | (d1. d2.Done+ d2. d1.Done) ) \{d1, d2} |
[[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
−→ (P1 [d1/done] | [[C2]][d2/done] | (d1. d2.Done+ d2. d1.Done) ) \{d1, d2} ↾ Env
for some P1 such that [[〈C1, s〉]]
τ
−→P1.
By induction there exist C ′1, C
′′
1 such that 〈C1, s〉
τ
−→〈C ′1, s〉 and P1 ≡ [[〈C
′′
1 , s〉]] >∼
[[〈C ′1, s〉]]. From P1 ≡ [[〈C
′′
1 , s〉]] = ( [[C
′′
1 ]] | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env we deduce:
(P1 [d1/done] | [[C2]] [d2/done] | (d1. d2.Done + d2. d1.Done) ) \{d1, d2} ↾ Env
≡ ( [[C ′′1 ]][d1/done] | [[C2]][d2/done] | (d1. d2.Done+ d2. d1.Done)) \{d1, d2} | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
>∼ ( [[C
′
1]][d1/done] | [[C2]][d2/done] | (d1. d2.Done+ d2. d1.Done)) \{d1, d2} | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= [[〈C ′1 ‖ C2, s〉]].
Since 〈C1 ‖ C2, s〉
τ
−→〈C ′1 ‖ C2, s〉, we may conclude.
✷
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Corollary D.4 (Relay computations are reflected by administrative computations)
If [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
−→P1 · · ·
τ
−→Pn is a sequence of relay moves, then there exist C1, . . . , Cn such
that 〈C, s〉
τ
7−→ 〈C1, s〉 · · ·
τ
7−→ 〈Cn, s〉 is a sequence of administrative moves and for each i,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, Pi >∼ [[〈Ci, s〉]].
Proof By induction on n. Let [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
−→P1 · · ·
τ
−→Pn be a sequence of relay moves. By
Lemma D.3, there exists C1 such that 〈C, s〉
τ
−→〈C1, s〉 and P1 >∼ [[〈C1, s〉]]. So if n = 1
the proof ends here. Suppose now n > 1. Since P1
τ
−→P2 · · ·
τ
−→Pn and >∼ preserves or
erases relay moves, there exist Q2, . . . , Qn such that [[〈C1, s〉]]
τ
7−→Q2 · · ·
τ
7−→Qn and for each
i, 2 ≤ i ≤ n, Pi >∼Qi. Since the sequence [[〈C1, s〉]]
τ
7−→Q2 · · ·
τ
7−→Qn has length k ≤ n− 1
(because each of its steps is either a relay move or the empty move), by induction there exist
C2, . . . , Cn such that 〈C1, s〉
τ
7−→ 〈C2, s〉 · · ·
τ
7−→ 〈Cn, s〉 is a sequence of administrative moves
where for each i, 2 ≤ i ≤ n, Qi>∼ [[〈Ci, s〉]]. Then 〈C, s〉
τ
−→〈C1, s〉
τ
7−→ 〈C2, s〉 · · ·
τ
7−→ 〈Cn, s〉
is the required administrative computation, since P1 >∼ [[〈C1, s〉]] and for each i, 2 ≤ i ≤ n,
Pi >∼Qi >∼ [[〈Ci, s〉]].. ✷
The next lemma states that, in a locking micro-computation, relay moves can always be
permuted with transaction moves in such a way that all relay moves are executed before
the transaction moves, leading to the same final state as the original micro-computation.
We call transaction prefix any computation which is the initial part of a transaction. A
transaction prefix is said to be proper if it does not coincide with the complete transaction.
Lemma D.5 (Permutation of transaction moves and relay moves)
Let 〈C, s〉 be a well-formed configuration and α ∈ ActEnv ∪ {τ}. If [[〈C, s〉]]
α
‖=⇒P1
τ
−→P is
a micro-computation where [[〈C, s〉]]
α
‖=⇒P1 is a proper transaction prefix and P1
τ
−→P is a
relay move, then there exists P2 such that [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
−→P2
α
‖=⇒P , where [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
−→P2 is a
relay move and P2
α
‖=⇒P is a proper transaction prefix.
Proof The property is straightforward for external transactions, since external transaction
moves and relay moves act in parallel on disjoint parts of an image-derivative (the former
act only on the abstract state, while the latter do not touch it). We prove the property for
internal transactions, by induction on the structure of C. Note that in the case of assignment,
conditional and loop statements, there is no possibility that a relay move follows an internal
transaction prefix within a single micro-computation. We examine the remaining cases.
1. C = C1;C2. Note that if C1 = nil or C1 reduces to nil by a sequence of administrative
moves, then [[〈C, s〉]] cannot immediately engage in an internal transaction. Otherwise,
any proper internal transaction prefix [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
‖=⇒P1 has the form:
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[[〈C1;C2, s〉]] = ( ([[C1]]Before [[C2]]) | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= ( ([[C1]][d/done] | d. [[C2]])\d | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
‖=⇒ ( (Q1[d/done] | d. [[C2]])\d ) ↾ Env = P1
for some Q1 such that [[〈C1, s〉]]
τ
‖=⇒Q1.
Since [[〈C1, s〉]]
τ
‖=⇒Q1 is a proper transaction prefix, the synchronisation between d
and d is not enabled, hence any relay move P1
τ
−→P must come from some relay
move Q1
τ
−→Q. Thus P = ( (Q [d/done] | d. [[C2]])\d ) ↾ Env. By induction there
exists Q2 such that [[〈C1, s〉]]
τ
−→Q2
α
‖=⇒Q, where [[〈C1, s〉]]
τ
−→Q2 is a relay move and
Q2
α
‖=⇒Q is a proper transaction prefix. Then we have [[〈C1;C2, s〉]]
τ
−→P2
α
‖=⇒P ,
where P2 = ( (Q2 [d/done] | d. [[C2]])\d ) ↾ Env.
2. C = (C1 ‖ C2). If both Ci are nil or reduce to nil by a sequence of administrative
moves, then [[〈C, s〉]] can only perform relay moves and has no internal transactions.
Otherwise, any proper internal transaction prefix [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
‖=⇒P1 is due to one of
the components [[Ci]], say [[C1]] (note that no communication is possible between the
components). Hence [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
‖=⇒P1 has the form:
[[〈C1 ‖ C2 , s〉]] = ( ( [[C1]]Par [[C2]] ) | [[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
= ( ( [[C1]][d1/done] | [[C2]][d2/done] | (d1. d2.Done+ d2. d1.Done) ) \{d1, d2} |
[[s]] | Sem ) ↾ Env
τ
‖=⇒ (Q1 [d1/done] | [[C2]][d2/done] | (d1. d2.Done+ d2. d1.Done) ) \{d1, d2} ↾ Env
for some Q1 such that [[〈C1, s〉]]
τ
‖=⇒Q1. Since [[〈C1, s〉]]
τ
‖=⇒Q1 is a proper transaction
prefix, the synchronisation between d1 and d1 is not enabled, hence any relay move
P1
τ
−→P must come either from some relay move Q1
τ
−→Q, in which case we proceed
by induction as in Case 1. above, or from some relay move involving only [[C2]], and
possibly also the component (d1. d2.Done+d2. d1.Done), in case C2 = nil. In the last
two cases, the relay move is independent from the transaction prefix [[〈C1, s〉]]
τ
‖=⇒Q1
and thus can be permuted with it, leading to the same final process P .
✷
We show now that every transaction prefix of a process [[〈C, s〉]] is reflected in the source
configuration 〈C, s〉 either by a single step or by inaction.
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Lemma D.6 (Transaction prefixes are reflected by the translation)
Let 〈C, s〉 be a well-formed configuration. Then:
1. If [[〈C, s〉]]
α
‖=⇒P is a transaction prefix, α ∈ ActEnv, then there exist P
′, C ′, s′ such
that P
τˆ
=⇒P ′ ≡ [[〈C ′, s′〉]], P ≈ P ′ and 〈C, s〉
α
−→〈C ′, s′〉. Moreover, if [[〈C, s〉]]
α
‖=⇒P
is a complete transaction, then P = P ′.
2. If [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
‖=⇒P is a transaction prefix, then either P ≈ [[〈C, s〉]] or there exist
P ′, C ′, s′ such that P
τˆ
=⇒P ′ ≡ [[〈C ′, s′〉]], P ≈ P ′ and 〈C, s〉
τ
−→〈C ′, s′〉. Moreover,
if [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
‖=⇒P is a complete transaction, then P = P ′.
Proof The proof of Statement 1 is obtained by reversing the proof of Lemma 3.3 and
observing that, as soon as the external action of [[〈C, s〉]]
α
‖=⇒P is performed, all the states of
the transaction prefix become weakly bisimilar to the final state of the complete transaction.
The proof of Statement 2, in the case where [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
‖=⇒P is an internal transaction
prefix, is obtained in a similar way. Here, as soon as the locking step of [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
‖=⇒P is
performed, all states become weakly bisimilar to the final state of the complete transaction.
Suppose now that [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
‖=⇒P consists of a single step which is the locking step of an
external transaction. This means that for some Xi ∈ dom(s), the register ORegXi(v), where
v = s(Xi), has moved to one of the states OReg
in
Xi
(v) or ORegoutXi (v) (as defined at page 41).
Then P ≈ [[〈C, s〉]], because P may release the lock and come back to [[〈C, s〉]]. ✷
We are now able to prove that every micro-computation of a process [[〈C, s〉]] is reflected
by a possibly empty sequence of steps of 〈C, s〉, at most one of which is a computing step.
Proposition D.7 (Micro-computations are reflected by the translation)
Let 〈C, s〉 be a well-formed configuration. Then:
1. If [[〈C, s〉]]
α
‖=⇒P , α ∈ ActEnv, then there exist C
′, s′ such that P ≈ [[〈C ′, s′〉]] and
〈C, s〉
α
=⇒〈C ′, s′〉. Moreover, if [[〈C, s〉]]
α
‖=⇒P is a complete micro-computation, then
P >∼ [[〈C
′, s′〉]].
2. If [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
‖=⇒P , then either P ≈ [[〈C, s〉]] or there exist C ′, s′ such that P ≈ [[〈C ′, s′〉]]
and 〈C, s〉
τ
=⇒〈C ′, s′〉. Moreover, if [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
‖=⇒P is a complete micro-computation,
then P >∼ [[〈C
′, s′〉]].
Proof The proofs of the two statements are similar, so let us assume [[〈C, s〉]]
α
‖=⇒P , where
α ∈ ActEnv ∪ {τ}.
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Now, if
α
‖=⇒ is a simple relay move8 or a transaction prefix, we have the result by Lemma D.3
or Lemma D.6, respectively. Otherwise,
α
‖=⇒ starts with the locking step of some transaction
and proceeds with an interleaving of transaction and relay moves. By repeated applications
of Lemma D.5, we can bring all relay moves in front position to obtain, for some n ≥ 1, a
computation of the form:
[[〈C, s〉]] = P0
τ
−→ · · ·
τ
−→Pn
α
‖=⇒P
where each Pi
τ
−→Pi+1 is a relay move and Pn
α
‖=⇒P is a transaction prefix. Then, by
Corollary D.4, we have a sequence of administrative moves for 〈C, s〉:
〈C, s〉 = 〈C0, s〉
τ
−→ · · ·
τ
−→〈Cn, s〉
such that for each i ≥ 1, Pi >∼ [[〈Ci, s〉]]. In particular Pn >∼ [[〈Cn, s〉]]. Then, since Pn
α
‖=⇒P
is a transaction prefix, there must exist Q such that [[〈Cn, s〉]]
α
‖=⇒Q is a transaction prefix
and P >∼ Q. By Lemma D.6, [[〈Cn, s〉]]
α
‖=⇒Q implies either Q ≈ [[〈Cn, s〉]], in which case
α = τ and 〈C, s〉
τ
=⇒〈Cn, s〉 is the required reflecting computation for [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
‖=⇒P , since
P >∼Q ≈ [[〈Cn, sn〉]], or there exist C
′, s′ such that 〈Cn, s〉
α
−→〈C ′, s′〉 and:
1. if [[〈Cn, s〉]]
α
‖=⇒Q is an incomplete transaction, thenQ
τˆ
=⇒ [[〈C ′, s′〉]] andQ ≈ [[〈C ′, s′〉]];
2. if [[〈Cn, s〉]]
α
‖=⇒Q is a complete transaction, then Q ≡ [[〈C ′, s′〉]].
In both cases 〈C, s〉
τ
=⇒〈Cn, s〉
α
−→〈C ′, s′〉 is the required reflecting computation. In case
1. we have P ≈ [[〈C ′, s′〉]] and in case 2. we have P >∼ [[〈C
′, s′〉]].
✷
Corollary D.8 (Sequences of micro-computations are reflected by the translation)
If [[〈C, s〉]]
α1
‖=⇒P1 · · ·
αn
‖=⇒Pn is a sequence of micro-computations, then there exist C1, . . . , Cn
and s1, . . . sn such that 〈C, s〉
cα1=⇒〈C1, s1〉 · · ·
cαn=⇒〈Cn, sn〉, where for each i, 1 ≤ i < n,
Pi >∼ [[〈Ci, si〉]] and:
1. If Pn−1
αn
‖=⇒Pn is a complete micro-computation, then Pn >∼ [[〈Cn, sn〉]];
2. If Pn−1
αn
‖=⇒Pn is not complete, then Pn ≈ [[〈Cn, sn〉]].
8Note that
α
‖=⇒ cannot be a sequence of several relay moves, since that would not constitute a single
micro-computation.
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Proof By induction on n. If n = 1 we have the result by Proposition D.7. Suppose
now that n > 1. By induction, [[〈C, s〉]] = P0
α1
‖=⇒P1 · · ·
αn−1
‖=⇒ Pn−1 implies that there exist
C1, . . . , Cn−1 and s1, . . . sn−1 such that 〈C, s〉
cα1=⇒〈C1, s1〉 · · ·
α̂n−1
=⇒ 〈Cn−1, sn−1〉, where for
each i, 1 ≤ i < n, Pi >∼ [[〈Ci, si〉]] (indeed, since Pn−2
αn−1
‖=⇒ Pn−1 is complete, by 1. we have
Pn−1>∼[[〈Cn−1, sn−1〉]]). Then, since Pn−1
αn
‖=⇒Pn, we deduce either Pn>∼[[〈Cn−1, sn−1〉]] (this
is possible if αn = τ and Pn−1
τ
‖=⇒Pn does not contain transaction moves and is simulated
by inaction), or [[〈Cn−1, sn−1〉]]
αn
‖=⇒Q, for some Q such that Pn >∼ Q. In the first case, we
have the reflecting computation 〈C, s〉
cα1=⇒〈C1, s1〉 · · ·
α̂n−1
=⇒ 〈Cn−1, sn−1〉
cαn=⇒〈Cn, sn〉, where
〈Cn−1, sn−1〉
cαn=⇒〈Cn, sn〉 is the empty computation and thus 〈Cn−1, sn−1〉 = 〈Cn, sn〉.
In the second case, by Proposition D.7 we have either [[〈Cn−1, sn−1〉]] ≈ Q, in which
case the reflecting computation is again 〈C, s〉
cα1=⇒〈C1, s1〉 · · ·
α̂n−1
=⇒ 〈Cn−1, sn−1〉
cαn=⇒〈Cn, sn〉
where 〈Cn−1, sn−1〉
cαn=⇒〈Cn, sn〉 is the empty computation, or there exist Cn, sn such that
〈Cn−1, sn−1〉
αn=⇒〈Cn, sn〉 and Q ≈ [[〈Cn, sn〉]], in which case the reflecting computation is
〈C, s〉
cα1=⇒〈C1, s1〉 · · ·
α̂n−1
=⇒ 〈Cn−1, sn−1〉
cαn=⇒〈Cn, sn〉, where Pn >∼Q ≈ [[〈Cn, sn〉]]. ✷
Proposition D.9 (Unique decomposition into micro-computations)
Let 〈C, s〉 be a well-formed configuration and α ∈ ActEnv ∪ {τ}. Then, each computation
[[〈C, s〉]]
α
=⇒P may be uniquely decomposed into a sequence of micro-computations of the
form [[〈C, s〉]] = P0
τ
‖=⇒P1 · · ·Pi
α
‖=⇒Pi+1 · · ·Pn−1
τ
‖=⇒Pn = P , where 0 ≤ i < n.
Proof By induction on the length k of the computation [[〈C, s〉]]
α
=⇒P . Note that the first
step of [[〈C, s〉]]
α
=⇒P is necessarily a τ -move. Then, if k = 1 the computation reduces to
[[〈C, s〉]]
τ
−→P : this is either a relay move, which is by itself a complete micro-computation,
or the locking step of a transaction, which is a proper transaction prefix, and hence a - non
complete - micro-computation.
Suppose now k > 1. If the first step is a relay move, the computation has the form
[[〈C, s〉]]
τ
−→ [[〈C0, s0〉]]
α
=⇒P . By induction [[〈C0, s0〉]]
α
=⇒P has a unique decomposition into
a sequence of micro-computations [[〈C0, s0〉]]
τ
‖=⇒P1 · · ·Pi
α
‖=⇒Pi+1 · · ·Pn−1
τ
‖=⇒Pn = P .
Then [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
−→ [[〈C0, s0〉]]
τ
‖=⇒P1 · · ·Pi
α
‖=⇒Pi+1 · · ·Pn−1
τ
‖=⇒Pn = P is the required de-
composition. Suppose now the first step of [[〈C, s〉]]
α
=⇒P is the locking step of a transac-
tion. Then the computation has the form [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
−→P0
α
=⇒P . Consider the longest prefix
P0
τ
−→P1 · · ·Pj
α
−→Pj+1 · · ·Pm−1
τ
−→Pm of the computation P0
α
=⇒P such that P1, . . . , Pm
are locked (this prefix could also have the form P0
τ
−→P1 · · ·Pm−1
τ
−→Pm, but we omit con-
sidering this case since it is treated similarly).
If Pm = P then [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
−→P0
τ
−→P1 · · ·Pj
α
−→Pj+1 · · ·Pm−1
τ
−→Pm = P is the re-
quired (non complete) micro-computation. Otherwise, there exists an unlocked Pm+1 such
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that Pm
τ
−→Pm+1
τ
=⇒P . Then [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
−→P0 · · ·Pj
α
−→Pj+1 · · ·Pm
τ
−→Pm+1 constitutes
a complete micro-computation [[〈C, s〉]]
α
‖=⇒Pm+1. Hence Pm+1 ≡ [[〈C
′, s′〉]] for some C ′, s′.
Then, corresponding to the computation Pm+1
τ
=⇒P , [[〈C ′, s′〉]] has a computation of the
same length [[〈C ′, s′〉]]
τ
=⇒Q, for some Q ≡ P . By induction [[〈C ′, s′〉]]
τ
=⇒Q has a unique de-
composition into a sequence of micro-computations [[〈C ′, s′〉]]
τ
‖=⇒Q1 · · ·Qh−1
τ
‖=⇒Qh = Q.
Let Pm+1
τ
‖=⇒R1 · · ·Rh−1
τ
‖=⇒Rh = P be the corresponding sequence of micro-computations
of Pm+1. Then the required decomposition for the whole computation is:
[[〈C, s〉]]
α
‖=⇒Pm+1
τ
‖=⇒R1 · · ·
τ
‖=⇒Rh = P
✷
Lemma 3.4 [Process transitions are reflected by the translation]
Let 〈C, s〉 be a well-formed configuration. Then:
1. If [[〈C, s〉]]
α
=⇒P , α ∈ ActEnv, then ∃C
′, s′ such that P ≈ [[〈C ′, s′〉]] and 〈C, s〉
α
=⇒〈C ′, s′〉.
2. If [[〈C, s〉]]
τ
=⇒P , then either P ≈ [[〈C, s〉]] or ∃C ′, s′ such that P ≈ [[〈C ′, s′〉]] and
〈C, s〉
τ
=⇒〈C ′, s′〉.
Proof Immediate consequence of Proposition D.9 and Corollary D.8. ✷
Adapting the proofs to the second translation
All the above proofs may be adapted, with some small modifications, to hold for the alter-
native translation of Figure 5. Let us briefly discuss the required changes.
Note first that, if one adopts the translation of Figure 5, an image derivative may perform,
in addition to relay moves and transactions, also silent moves which transform a conditional
(if v then [[C1]] else [[C2]]) into one of its branches depending on the value v. Such moves,
which we call steering moves, occur in the simulation of conditionals and loops, after the
semaphore has been released, and are reflected by the empty computation in the source
program. If P is an image-derivative, let us call a move P
τ
−→P ′ autonomous if it is either
a relay move or a steering move. Then, by replacing relay moves by autonomous moves
in the definition of the expansion preorder, and adapting correspondingly the proofs of
Proposition D.7, Proposition D.9 and Lemma D.6 (whose statement also needs to be adapted
by replacing P = P ′ by P >∼ P
′), one may extend the various results to the translation of
Figure 5.
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E Proofs of Proposition 3.11 and Theorem 3.13
Proposition 3.11 [Characterisation of ≃L in terms of ∼H ]
Let C,D be PARIMP programs. Then C ≃L D if and only if for any state s such that 〈C, s〉
and 〈D, s〉 are well-formed, we have 〈C, s〉 ∼H 〈D, s〉\EnvH and 〈C, s〉\EnvH ∼H 〈D, s〉.
Proof Proof of ⇒: Let C ≃L D. We want to show that for any state s we have both
〈C, s〉 ∼H 〈D, s〉\EnvH and 〈C, s〉\EnvH ∼H 〈D, s〉. Consider the following relation:
S = { ( 〈C1, s1〉, 〈C2, s2〉\EnvH ) | C1 ≃L C2 , s1 =L s2 and 〈Ci, si〉 is well-formed } ∪
{ ( 〈C1, s1〉\EnvH , 〈C2, s2〉 ) | C1 ≃L C2 , s1 =L s2 and 〈Ci, si〉 is well-formed }
Note that S is symmetric and for any state s such that 〈C, s〉 and 〈D, s〉 are well-formed,
the two pairs (〈C, s〉, 〈D, s〉\EnvH) and (〈C, s〉\EnvH , 〈D, s〉) belong to S. We show now
that S is a bisimulation up to high. Since well-formedness is preserved by execution, we
shall not mention it further in the proof. Take a pair ( 〈C1, s1〉, 〈C2, s2〉\EnvH ) in S.
Let us start with the case where 〈C1, s1〉 moves first.
❼ Suppose that 〈C1, s1〉
τ
−→〈C ′1, s
′
1〉. This means that 〈C1, s1〉 → 〈C
′
1, s
′
1〉. Since by
hypothesis C1 ≃L C2 and s1 =L s2, this implies 〈C2, s2〉 7→ 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉 for some C
′
2, s
′
2
such that C ′1 ≃L C
′
2 and s
′
1 =L s
′
2. This means that 〈C2, s2〉
τ
7−→H 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉. Hence
〈C2, s2〉\EnvH
τ
7−→H 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉\EnvH , where (〈C
′
1, s
′
1〉, 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉\EnvH) is again in S.
❼ Suppose now 〈C1, s1〉
inXv−−−→ 〈C ′1, s
′
1〉. By Remark 3.2, C
′
1 = C1 and s
′
1 = s1[v/X].
Assume first that X ∈ H. Then s1[v/X] =L s1 =L s2, so 〈C2, s2〉\EnvH can reply by
the empty move. Suppose now X ∈ L. By Remark 3.2, 〈C2, s2〉
inXv−−−→ 〈C2, s2[v/X] 〉.
Since inX /∈ EnvH , 〈C2, s2〉\EnvH
inXv−−−→ 〈C2, s2[v/X]〉\EnvH , which is the required
matching move since s1 =L s2 implies s1[v/X] =L s2[v/X].
❼ The case where 〈C1, s1〉
outXv−−−−→ 〈C ′1, s
′
1〉 is similar (and simpler, since s
′
1 = s1).
Consider now the case where 〈C2, s2〉\EnvH moves first.
❼ Suppose that 〈C2, s2〉\EnvH
α
−→〈C ′2, s
′
2〉\EnvH . This transition is derived by rule
(Res-Op) from 〈C2, s2〉
α
−→〈C ′2, s
′
2〉, subj (α) /∈ EnvH . Note that either α = τ or
subj (α) ∈ EnvL. In the first case we have 〈C2, s2〉
τ
−→〈C ′2, s
′
2〉. Since C1 ≃L C2
and s1 =L s2, this implies 〈C1, s1〉 7→ 〈C
′
1, s
′
1〉, and thus 〈C1, s1〉
τ
7−→H 〈C
′
1, s
′
1〉 for
some C ′1, s
′
1 such that C
′
1 ≃L C
′
2 and s
′
1 =L s
′
2. In the second case subj (α) ∈ EnvL.
Suppose for instance 〈C2, s2〉\EnvH
inXv−−−→ 〈C2, s2[v/X]〉\EnvH . By Remark 3.2,
〈C1, s1〉
inXv−−−→ 〈C1, s1[v/X] 〉. From s1 =L s2 we deduce s1[v/X] =L s2[v/X], so this
is the required matching move. The case where α = outXv is similar.
This ends the “only if” part of the proof.
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Proof of ⇐: Suppose 〈C, s〉 ∼H 〈D, s〉\EnvH and 〈C, s〉\EnvH ∼H 〈D, s〉 for any state s.
Define the relation S as:
S = { (C1, C2 ) | ∀ state t : ( 〈C1, t〉 ∼H 〈C2, t〉\EnvH ∧ 〈C1, t〉\EnvH ∼H 〈C2, t〉 ) }
The relation S is symmetric and contains the pair (C,D). We show that S is a L-bisimulation.
Take (C1, C2) ∈ S. Let s1, s2 be such that s1 =L s2. Since 〈C1, s2〉 ∼H 〈C2, s2〉\EnvH ,
by repeatedly applying Corollary 3.9 we obtain 〈C1, s1〉 ∼H 〈C2, s2〉\EnvH . Similarly, by
Corollary 3.9, 〈C1, s1〉\EnvH ∼H 〈C2, s1〉 implies 〈C1, s1〉\EnvH ∼H 〈C2, s2〉.
❼ Suppose first 〈C1, s1〉
τ
−→〈C ′1, s
′
1〉. Since 〈C1, s1〉 ∼H 〈C2, s2〉\EnvH , there exist C
′
2, s
′
2
such that 〈C2, s2〉\EnvH
τ
7−→H 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉\EnvH and 〈C
′
1, s
′
1〉 ∼H 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉\EnvH . We
distinguish two cases, according to wether
τ
7−→H is the empty move or a proper move.
Case i). If
τ
7−→H is the empty move, we have 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉\EnvH = 〈C2, s2〉\EnvH , hence
by transitivity 〈C ′1, s
′
1〉 ∼H 〈C1, s1〉. Then 〈C
′
1, s
′
1〉\EnvH ∼H 〈C1, s1〉\EnvH by
Property 3.6. Combining the various equalities we obtain: 〈C ′1, s
′
1〉 ∼H 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉\EnvH
and 〈C ′1, s
′
1〉\EnvH ∼H 〈C1, s1〉\EnvH ∼H 〈C2, s2〉 = 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉.
Case ii). If
τ
7−→H is a proper τ -transition, it is deduced from 〈C2, s2〉
τ
−→〈C ′2, s
′
2〉.
Since 〈C1, s1〉\EnvH ∼H 〈C2, s2〉, this implies that there exist C
′′
1 , s
′′
1 such that
〈C1, s1〉\EnvH
τ
7−→H 〈C
′′
1 , s
′′
1〉\EnvH and 〈C
′′
1 , s
′′
1〉\EnvH ∼H 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉. Now, by
Lemma 3.10, 〈C ′1, s
′
1〉 ∼H 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉\EnvH implies 〈C
′
1, s
′
1〉\EnvH ∼H 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉\EnvH ,
and 〈C ′′1 , s
′′
1〉\EnvH ∼H 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉 implies 〈C
′′
1 , s
′′
1〉\EnvH ∼H 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉\EnvH . Then
by transitivity we obtain 〈C ′1, s
′
1〉\EnvH ∼H 〈C
′′
1 , s
′′
1〉\EnvH .
In both cases we have 〈C ′1, s
′
1〉 ∼H 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉\EnvH and 〈C
′
1, s
′
1〉\EnvH ∼H 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉.
To obtain (C ′1, C
′
2) ∈ S, what is left to do is to replace s
′
1 and s
′
2 by an arbitrary state
t in these equalities. Note that by Property 3.5 s′1 =L s
′
2, hence dom(s
′
1) = dom(s
′
2).
For any state t, let the low and high parts of t be denoted by tL and tH respectively,
so that t = tL ∪ tH . Using Lemmas 3.7 and 3.8 we may now update the low and high
parts of s′1, s
′
2 so as to transform both of them into t. More precisely, starting from:
〈C ′1, s
′
1〉 ∼H 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉\EnvH ∧ 〈C
′
1, s
′
1〉\EnvH ∼H 〈C
′
2, s
′
2〉
we may update the low part of each s′i using Lemma 3.7, so as to obtain:
〈C ′1, tL ∪ s
′
1H〉 ∼H 〈C
′
2, tL ∪ s
′
2H〉\EnvH ∧ 〈C
′
1, tL ∪ s
′
1H〉\EnvH ∼H 〈C
′
2, tL ∪ s
′
2H〉
Using Lemma 3.8, we may now update the high part of each state to get:
〈C ′1, tL ∪ tH〉 ∼H 〈C
′
2, tL ∪ tH〉\EnvH ∧ 〈C
′
1, tL ∪ tH〉\EnvH ∼H 〈C
′
2, tL ∪ tH〉
which is the required result.
❼ The case where 〈C2, s2〉 moves first is symmetric.
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Theorem 3.13 [Bisimilarity up to high is preserved by the translation]
Let R,R′ ⊆ EnvH . Then 〈C, s〉\R ∼H 〈D, t〉\R
′ implies [[〈C, s〉\R ]] ≈H [[〈D, t〉\R
′ ]], where
H
def
= { getX , putX , inX , outX | X ∈ H } ∪ { lock, unlock, res, done }.
Proof We show that the relation S defined as follows:
S = { (W1,W2 ) | Wi ≈ [[cfgi]] for some cfgi = 〈Ci, si〉\Ri such that Ri ⊆ EnvH and
cfg1 ∼H cfg2}
is a weak bisimulation up to H. Clearly the pair ( [[〈C, s〉\R ]], [[〈D, t〉\R′ ]] ) belongs to S.
❼ SupposeW1
τ
−→W ′1. SinceW1 ≈ [[cfg1]], there exists P1 such that [[cfg1]]
τˆ
=⇒P1 ≈W
′
1.
Now, if P1 = [[cfg1]], then W
′
1 ≈ W1 and W2 may reply by staying idle. Otherwise,
[[cfg1]]
τ
=⇒P1 ≈ W
′
1. Then, by Lemma 3.4, we know that either P1 ≈ [[cfg1]], in which
case W ′1 ≈ W1 and W2 may reply by staying idle, or there exists cfg
′
1 such that
W ′1 ≈ [[cfg
′
1]] and cfg1
τˆ
=⇒ cfg′1. In this case, since cfg1 ∼H cfg2, there exists cfg
′
2 such
that cfg2
τˆ
=⇒ cfg′2 and cfg
′
1 ∼H cfg
′
2. Then, by Lemma 3.3, we know that there exists
P2 such that [[cfg2]]
τˆ
=⇒P2 ≈ [[cfg
′
2]]. Since W2 ≈ [[cfg2]], this implies that there exists
W ′2 such that W2
τˆ
=⇒W ′2 and W
′
2 ≈ P2 ≈ [[cfg
′
2]]. Hence (W
′
1,W
′
2 ) ∈ S and we may
conclude.
❼ Suppose now that W1
α
−→W ′1, where α 6= τ . Since W1 ≈ [[cfg1]], there exists P1 such
that [[cfg1]]
α
=⇒P1 ≈W
′
1. Then, by Lemma 3.4, there exists cfg
′
1 such that W
′
1 ≈ [[cfg
′
1]]
and cfg1
α
=⇒ cfg′1. We can decompose cfg1
α
=⇒ cfg′1 as cfg1
τˆ
=⇒ cfg′′1
α
−→ cfg′′′1
τˆ
=⇒ cfg′1.
Since cfg1 ∼H cfg2, cfg2 may simulate this transition sequence either by a sequence
cfg2
τˆ
=⇒ cfg′′2
α
−→ cfg′′′2
τˆ
=⇒ cfg′2, where cfg
′′
1 ∼H cfg
′′
2 , cfg
′′′
1 ∼H cfg
′′′
2 and cfg
′
1 ∼H cfg
′
2,
or possibly, in case α ∈ EnvH , by a sequence of the form cfg2
τˆ
=⇒ cfg′′2
τˆ
=⇒ cfg′2, where
cfg′′1 ∼H cfg
′′
2 and cfg
′
1 ∼H cfg
′
2. By (repeated applications of) Lemma 3.3, we obtain
in the first case [[cfg2]]
α
=⇒P2 ≈ [[cfg
′
2]], and in the second case [[cfg2]]
τˆ
=⇒P2 ≈ [[cfg
′
2]].
Since W2 ≈ [[cfg2]], this implies that there exists W
′
2 such that W
′
2 ≈ P2 ≈ [[cfg
′
2]]
and either W2
α
=⇒W ′2 (in the first case) or W2
τˆ
=⇒W ′2 (in the second case). Therefore
(W ′1,W
′
2 ) ∈ S and we may conclude.
✷
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